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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Importance of Studying Debt 
The understanding of debt arid the debt policies of 
firms remains one of the major problems of finance. The 
questions of how debt affects the value of the firm and how 
firms should utilize debt over time {debt policy) remain 
unanswered. Despite a great deal of study, debate, and 
argument, there is no accepted, coherent theory OI capital 
structure. Without a theory to explain capital structure, it 
is impossible to develop coherent debt policies, either on a 
firm level or on a national level. 
Further study of this area is critical for three 
reasons. First, debt has been and will continue to be a 
major source of funding for firms. Second, the lack or 
consensus on the effect of debt upon the firm has left 
decision makers on both the firm level and the national 
economic level with few tools with which to make debt-
related decisions. Finally, debt policy, from buth the firm 
and the national economy viewpoints, will become even more 
important in the future. 
Debt is a major source or funding for firms, with 
1 
2 
manuf~cturing firms averaging approximately 30% 1 of their 
total funding from debt. The use of debt among publicly 
traded firms is almost universal, although the actual deb~ 
level employed varies widely. 
Debt levels in firms, however, have remained fairly 
consistent over time, despite massive differences in tax 
policy and major changes in the economy from the 1920's to 
the post-World-War II era (60). This almost universal and 
reasonably consistent use of debt suggests that debt has 
some value to firms and that there should be some optimal 
debt level for a particular firm. 
That this use of debt entails some risk for the firm is 
evident from the record number of bankruptcies during the 
recessions of the early 1980's. Many of these bankruptcies 
were caused by an inability either to meet fixed payments or 
to refinance past indebtedness. A trend toward higher debt 
levels started during the early 1970's and possibly 
contributed to the instability of the late 1970's as well as 
the bankruptcies of the 1980's (54). This non-prudent use of 
debt (at least in hindsight) was due in part to a lack of 
understanding of how debt and debt policies affect the risk 
of the firm. If the actual relationship ot debt, risk and 
value were properly understood, firms employing excessive 
debt would have been identified by the market and such debt 
1 The actual average percentage of debt to total assets is 
dependent on the sample used. The figure of 30% is from the 




The effect of debt on both the value of tne firm and 
the risk of the firm has long been debated. From a 
microeconomic standpoint, the use of debt can increase tne 
stream of income available to shareholders. This increase in 
income to shareholders that results from financial leverage 
also causes an increase in the variability of this income 
stream over time as the sales level varies. The use ot debt 
obligates the firm to a fixed charge of interest and a 
repayment of the principal at some future time period. These 
fixed charges increase the probability of bankruptcy, as 
bankruptcy would occur at a higher sales level for a levered 
firm than for an unlevered firm. In addition, this leverage 
can reduce the stream of income available to stockholders if 
sales do not rise above the "switch" or "breakeven" point. 
This switch or breakeven point is the sales level wnere 
returns to shareholders are greater if the firm is levered 
rather than unlevered. 
The value of debt to the firm can be approached from 
either a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or a Cost of 
Capital approach. From a CAPM approach, it can be shown 
that as the debt level of the firm increases, the standard 
deviation ot returns of the firm will increase, thus 
increasing the Beta of the stock. As long as this use of 
debt increases the stream of income available to 
stockholders suff icently to remain above the Security Market 
Line, this further addition of debt will aad value to the 
firm. This would argue that there is some trade-off between 
4 
increasing returns and bankruptcy costs and that firms have 
some optimal debt level. 
From a Cost of Capital approach, the use or debt 
reduces the weighted average cost of capital. Debt cost 
begins to increase as more debt is used (the firm is more 
risky), but the increasing use of less expensive debt rather 
than more expensive equity reduces the average cost or 
capital. At some point, the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) is minimized. By minimizing the WACC, a firm 
maximizes the "spread" between the return on projects and 
the cost of financing these projects, and increases the 
number of projects the firm can undertake. This maximizing 
of the spread between the cost of financing projects and the 
return on the projects would also argue that there exists 
some optimal debt level for a firm. 
Lack of Consensus on the Effect of Debt 
While the microeconomic approach to estimating the 
value of debt is appealing, from a macroeconomic or market 
approach, the value of debt is much less certain. In their 
seminal paper (1958) Miller and Modigliani (62) (henceforth 
MM) demonstrated that in a world with no taxes, leverage 
should have no effect upon the value of the firm. In a later 
paper (1963), MM (64) further argued that in a world with 
taxes, debt does add a small amount of value through the tax 
shield, which represents a .risk-free perpetual stream of 
income. The implication of these two papers is that firms, 
5 
in the absence of taxes, should have no debt (or be 
indifferent to the level ot debt), or, with taxes, should 
have all debt (66). 
Since these two papers, the debate and arguments have 
continued, with disagreements even between Miller and 
Modigliani. Miller (60), in 1977, argued that the supply or 
debt offered by firms is limited because firms must raise 
rates on bonds enough to attract investors, and this rate is 
so high that debt is no longer of value to the firm. Miller 
indicated that firms may be indifferent to debt levels even 
with the tax shield. Modigliani (66), in 1982, argued that 
debt does have value due to the tax shield. However, the 
earlier estimates of the value may be too high, since 
investors regard these tax savings as a flow subject to 
risk, like the underlying prof it stream, rather than as a 
risk-free perpetuity. 
Thus, Miller argues that debt level is a matter or 
indifference to firms while Modigliani argues that debt 
level is of importance but the level is less than would be 
expected, given the value of the tax shield, because of four 
reasons. Modigliani argued firms did not use a maximium 
amount of debt because of bankruptcy costs, agency costs, 
possible foregone-valuable opportunities, and the increasing 
probability, as debt increases, that income will fall to a 
level where the tax shelter has no value (66). 
Further, this lack of consensus over the value of debt 
is not limited to issues orginally raised by MM. Others 
have argued that factors divorced from the issues raised by 
6 
MM greatly affect the determination of the value of debt to 
a firm. Myers (67), in 1977, argued that leverage is a 
function of the value and relative size of the two "bundles" 
of assets that comprise the total assets of the firm. These 
two bundles are assets in place and options on possible new 
projects for the firm. This would suggest that leverage is 
of varying value to different firms, depending on the 
relative size and value of the two bundles of assets. 
would also suggest that estimating the optimal debt 
This 
ratio 
for a firm would require much more information not currently 
available to the market. 
Ross ( 73, 7 4) in 1977, and Leland and Pyle (52) , in 
1977, argued that debt is more than a means to affect the 
value of the firm. These authors felt that debt is a 
"signal" used by the firm to alert investors and the market 
about the future of the firm without disclosing privileged 
information. 
Jensen and Mechling (47), in 1976, argued that agency 
costs determined the optimal "ownership" structure. This 
ownership structure was defined as composed of manager-held 
equity, outsider-held equity, and outsider-held debt. Jensen 
and Mechling suggested that these agency costs (which can be 
viewed as essentially fixed costs regardless of 
result in different optimal structures for firms, in 





From the variety of certainly non-exclusive viewpoints 
7 
presented above, it is obvious that there exists no 
accepted, coherent theory explaining either the value of 
debt or the parameters that determine an optimal debt level. 
This lack of a theory presents great problems, as questions 
regarding debt level and debt policy are likely to become 
even more important in the future. 
Increasing Importance of Debt Policy 
During the post-World War II period there has been a 
great change in the financial environment. In the early 
post-World War II period there was a conscious policy of 
keeping interest rates down through monetary policy. 
Coupled with the inflows of money from abroad in this period 
and the high personal savings rate, this policy resulted in 
stable, low cost funding for firms. However, in the early 
1970's the greater demands for funds, both here and abroad, 
and the inflationary pressures, in part generated by 
monetary policy, pushed up the costs of funds drastically. 
This increasing cost of funds came at a time when firms 
were facing ever greater competition, with the resultant 
lower prof it margins, making cost control a critical area. 
Due to the increase in interest rates, interest has become a 
major cost for most firms. From a cost of capital 
standpoint, the higher interest rates have decreased the 
number of acceptable projects for the firm, further cutting 
growth and profitability. While in the past, technology 
generally gave some firms a decided advantage, technology is 
no longer a monopoly of a few companies or countries. 
8 
Further, the rapid pace of technological innovation requires 
more frequent changes in machinery and, hence, more frequent 
financing. These factors of higher cost funding, more rapid 
technological obsolescence, and greater competition means 
firms must make financing decisions more often, and the 
margin for error on these decisions will be much less. 
Further, the access to capital markets will continue to 
be unequal. In numerous industries, companies are able to 
obtain below market rates and, in some cases, guarantees to 
help meet fixed charges, which gives them a decided 
advantage in world markets. The aggressive use of 
government backed financing of targeted industries, the 
financing of projects to meet state goals such as 
employment, and protectionist, political and defensive 
considerations will make survivial and growth of firms with 
normal access to markets even more difficult. 
As a result of these changes in the environment, firms 
will be faced more often with the question of what is 
optimal debt policy. The answer to this question requires a 
better understanding of the value of debt and also requires 
a model that accounts for both the macroeconomic or market 
viewpoint and the microeconomic viewpoint. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, the study 
presents a theoretical model that argues the importance of 
the inter-period timing relationship of changes in leverage 
9 
and changes in business risk to understanding the value of 
debt. From this it is argued that leverage has great value 
to certain firms, even though leverage, on average, may have 
only slight value to all firms as suggested by MM and 
Modigliani, or may be a matter of indifference, on average, 
to firms, as suggested by Miller (60). 
Second, the study presents empirical testing that 
suggests firms function in a manner consistent with the 
theoretical model. 
Approach of the Study 
The theoretical model is built upon several basic 
assumptions. The first is the importance of timing 
relationships between changes in financial structure and 
changes in business risk. Prior studies have generally been 
static in nature, with single period horizons and 
assumptions that allowed instantaneous changes in financial 
structure. The majority of empirical studies, in 
particular, relied on cross-sectional analysis, in part 
because of the difficulties inherent in modeling leading and 
lagging variables. The present study assumes that the 
results of financial structure decisions, at least in terms 
of the results shown on the balance sheet, are not 
instantaneous. There is a time lag between the decision to 
change the financial structure and the actual recording of 
that change on the balance sheet. This time lag results 
because there are legal and regulatory delays and because 
the results of financial structure change are noted at the 
10 
end of the period when reports are issued. For the purposes 
of this study, since annual data were utilized, the period 
is defined as one year. This means that a decision made 
late in one period may not be recorded until the end of the 
next period. Thus, there is a lag between when the decision 
to ~hange financial structure is made and the recording of 
that change. 
Further, the study assumes that managers are future 
oriented and make changes now to erisure that stockholder 
wealth is maximized in the future. To this end, managers 
use debt as a means to "signal" investors of upcoming 
changes in the firm. 
A third assumption is concerned with the conflict 
between the microeconomic and the macroeconomic approach. 
The macroeconomic approach correctly uses marginal analysis, 
but shows at the margin, debt is of little or no value 
(depending upon the assumptions of the macro-model) to the 
average firm. However, the value of leverage, from a micro-
viewpoint, is not equal for all firms. First, the 
opportunity to issue new securities differs between firms 
because of past financing decisions, relative stability ot 
earnings, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and indenture 
provisions. Second, the value of debt, again from a micro-
viewpoint, differs between firms because of the varying 
costs of debt to different firms, thus affecting their cost 
of capital and the investment opportunities open to firms. 
From an MM, or macroeconomic standpoint, the value of 
11 
debt is greater for firms that are less risky. The stream of 
income from the tax benefit of debt should be discounted at 
a rate closer to the risk free rate for a less risky firm. 
Second, for less risky firms, there is a lower probability 
that income will drop to the point where tax benefits lose 
value. Third, for less risky firms, issuing of debt has only 
slight effects on future bankruptcy costs and agency costs, 
so future opportunities are not as affected by present 
decisions. Finally, some firms can issue debt at rates that 
are lower than the rate described by Miller (60) as 
necessary to attract investors. These firms can issue bonds 
at rates which ensure marketability yet add value to the 
firm. 
This segmentation of firms into groups based on the 
relative value additivity of debt would first suggest that 
some firms would use no debt if indeed debt was of little 
value to that firm. Rather, however, this assumption (that 
some firms can better use debt to increase value) means that 
the relationship between debt policy, ·value and risk should 
be clearer in a sample composed of firms which can best use 
debt to increase value. 
The Theoretical Model 
This study presents a theoretical model that explains 
the relationship between business risk and financial 
structure. Business risk is defined as that basic risk 
inherent in a firm's operations resulting from the inherent 
uncertainty or variability of expected pretax returns 
12 
(usually measured in terms of standard deviation) on the 
firm's portfolio of assets. The purpose of this model is to 
show that, as financial theory suggests, there should be a 
measurable relationship between the financial structure and 
business risk of a firm, and hence, that the financial 
structure, as measured by the debt to total asset ratio, of 
the firm is important. The theoretical model to be 
developed explains why this relationship between financial 
structure and business risk is lagged, and how managers 
adjust financial structure to maximize firm value. 
In particular, this study develops a theoretical model 
that explains the timing of changes in business risk and 
changes in financial structure. The relationship between 
changes in business risk and changes in financial structure 
is important for two reasons. First, this relationship is 
critical to understanding how and why managers change 
financial structure in attempting to maximize shareholder 
wealth. Second, this relationship explains why empirical 
studies in the past have been unable to link financial 
structure, business risk and value. 
Importance of This Study 
Financial theory generally accepts that firm value can 
be changed through the use of debt and that the financial 
structure that maximizes the value of the firm is strongly 
correlated with expected returns {measured as net operating 
income) and hence, the business risk of the firm. However, 
13 
no theoretical model has yet fully explained the timing 
relationship between financial structure and business risk. 
In addition, no empirical evidence strongly supports links 
between debt level and business risk. This study is 
concerned with how debt and business risk are related, and 
how this relationship supports the importance of financial 
structure. 
This study presents a theoretical model that explains 
the inter-period relationship between financial structure 
and business risk. This inter-period theoretical model 
concentrates on the relationship between year-to-year 
changes in financial structure and changes in business risk. 
From this theoretical model, an empirical model was 
developed. This empirical model demonstrates that firms 
exhibit behavior that tends to support the hypothesized 
relationship of financial st~ucture and business risk, and 
hence, adds support to the concept that financial structure 
does influence value. In addition, this model provides 
support of the "signaling" function of financial structure 
change suggested by Ross (73,74) and Leland and Pyle (52). 
Assumptions of the Model 
The model proposed makes several implicit assumptions 
about the behavior of managers, the effect of debt on the 
firm, the effect of financial markets on firm value, and the 
time necessary to make changes in financial structure. One 
assumption, following the work of Jensen and Mechling (47), 
is that managers attempt to maximize the value of the firm 
14 
because it is in their best interests. A second assumption 
is that debt can increase the value of the firm as suggested 
by modern financial theory. A third assumption is that 
financial markets are efficient in the sense that markets 
utilize all available information. Finally, this study 
assumes that some amount of time is necessary to carry out a 
change in financial structure2. 
The Model 
The theoretical model proposed explains the 
relationship between changes in financial structure and 
change in the business risk of the firm. The model 
postulates that there is an inter-period lag (with a period 
being defined as one year) between changes in financial 
structure and changes in business risk. This lag is due to 
four factors: an asymmetrical distribution of information 
between managers and the financial markets, the increase in 
the information known to the financial markets over time, 
the time necessary to change financial structure, and the 
use of changes in financial structure to "signal" to the 
financial markets about the future propects of the firm. • 
2 This amount of time to carry out a change in financial 
structure is dependent on numerous factors explained later. 
The important point here, particularly from an empirical 
standpoint, is that any change in financial structure will 
not be recorded, at best, until the next annual or year end 
report. 
The Existence ~f an Asymmetrical 
Distribution of Information 
15 
If the value of the firm is estimated from a viewpoint 
of Myers' (67) model of the firm, it can be shown that the 
manager is in the best position to estimate the future 
business risk of the firm because of the superior 
information the manager has regarding the future business 
risk of the firm. As a result of this superior information, 
the manager can make decisions that will adjust the 
financial structure to ensure that the value of the firm is 
maximized. 
Myers' model (67) of the firm suggests that the firm's 
value is the summation of the value of two "bundles" of 
assets: the assets in place and the options the firm holds 
on future projects. Over time, the value of each one of 
these bundles can change as future sales for the present 
output of the assets in place changes and as the relative 
value of the options that the firm holds (i.e., future 
projects) changes. Thus, even though the future sales of 
the present products of the firm may remain constant, the 
future business risk of the firm may change as the value of 
the options held by the firm changes. This information about 
future projects is known, at best, only in general to the 
market. As a result of this superior information about the 
options of the firm and the assets in place, the manager of 
the firm is best able to estimate the value of the firm. 
The value of the firm, using Myers' model is: 
16 
V = Ap + Of (1) 
where AP = value of assets in place 
Of = value of future projects the firm has options on. 
The information that the market has about the firm is 
made up two subsets: information known to the market about 
the assets in place and information known to the market 
about the future options of the firm. The market has some 
information about the value of assets in place. This 
information known bi the market about the assets in place 
will generally be less than the information known by the 
firm. 
The information about the assets in place of the firm 
can be defined as: 
1pa = 1am + 1af + 1au (2) 
where Ipa = total information about assets in place if no 
uncertainty existed 
Iam = information about assets in place known to the 
market {and the firm) 
Iaf = information about assets in place known only to 
the firm 
Iau = information that is unknowable because of 
uncertainty. 
As noted above, in most cases, the management of the firm 
will have superior information to the information known to 
the participants within the markets (i.e., Iaf > 0). This 
means that the management of the firm is in a superior 
position to the participants in the financial markets in 
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estimating the value of the assets in place. But the amount 
of information known by the management is not much greater 
than the amount of information known by market participants. 
This slight difference between information known only within 
the firm and information known to the market results 
because a great deal of background information is available 
if a product has been on the market for awhile. In addition, 
information from competitors, suppliers, marketing surveys 
and other non-firm sources of information can be used to 
estimate future sales and future risk of the existing 
product. 
However, the second subset of information about the 
future projects on which the firm has options has a 
different distribution between the firm and the market. The 
second subset of information, about the options of the firm, 
can be divided in the same fashion as the information about 
the assets in place. The financial markets have little 
information regarding the value of the future options of the 
firm. Because of competitive needs for secrecy about future 
projects, firms cannot give the financial markets very much 
specific information about future projects. The total 
information about the future projects on which the firm has 
options can be defined as 
1op = Iom + Iof + Iou (3) 
where Iop = information about future projects assuming 
perfect certainty 
= information about future projects known to 
financial markets and the firm 
18 
Iof = information about future projects known only to 
the firm 
I 0 u = information about future projects that is 
unknowable because of uncertainty. 
As in the case of the assets in place, I 0 f > O, but the 
difference in information known only by the firm and that 
known by the market is far greater than for the assets in 
place. The information known only to the firm may in fact 
include the existence and feasibility of projects completely 
unknown to the markets. This would be particularly true in 
larger firms with many diversified divisions, where research 
and development endeavors are wide-ranging and where the 
firm has numerous channels available to develop new ideas. 
Changes in Financial Structure 
As new information becomes available to the firm, the 
future prospects of the assets in place and the options on 
future projects change. Thus, as new information is gained, 
the business risk of the firm and the estimated future 
business risk of the firm changes. At any given point in 
time, the firm generally enjoys a slight advantage in 
information over the market regarding the assets in place 
and a large advantage in information regarding future 
projects on which the firm holds options. But this "firm" 
information, which affects the business risk of the firm, 
will become known, at least in part, to the market. 
Because part or all of this information will become 
19 
known to the market, management of firm must adjust the 
financial structure of the firm to maximize the value of the 
firm, given the new level of business risk. This flow of 
information from that known only to the firm to that known 
by the financial markets is continuous, although not 
necessarily regular. Firms realize this, and also realize 
that once this new information is known to the market, the 
value of the firm will change. Given the new level of 
business risk resulting from the new information, management 
must adjust the financial structure of the firm in order to 
maximize the value of the firm. 
Management adjusts the financial structure of the firm 
to maximize value for the predicted conditions of the firm. 
This adjustment is made irrespective of whether this 
adjustment increases or decreases the value from the present 
value. The case for changing the financial structure is 
obvious if the change in business risk is such that changes 
in the financial structure will increase value. However, 
the case for changing financial structure if such changes 
will reduce value is not as clear. Management may have to 
make changes in financial structure which will decrease the 
value of the firm from P0 to P1 (Po>P1 ) if such a change 
will avoid a decrease from Po to P2 where P2 <P1 . 
This case for decreasing the value of the firm can be 
seen by again assuming that management will attempt to 
maximize the value of the firm, thus insuring the maximium 
wealth for shareholders and management. Assume that the 
management has received new information that affects the 
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future business risk of the firm. This new information 
increases management's advantage from (Iaf + I 0 f) to (Iaf' + 
Iof'). But management is aware that this information that 
changes the business risk of the firm will become public 
knowledge. Given the following definitions, 
Vm = present market value of firm based on Iam and 
1om 
Vfm = future market value of firm if Iaf' and Iof' 
were known to the market and 
financial changes are made to 
maximize value given the new level 
of business risk 
Vfm' = future value of the firm if financial 
structure changes to optimal 
level are not made given Iaf' and 
Iof' are known to market 
it can be shown that management will change the financial 
structure even if the change in financial structure lowers 
the value of the firm. Assuming that the new information 
results in changes in the business risk, the management 
faces not doing anything and risking having the value of the 
firm fall to Vfm' once this new information is available to 
the market. However, if the management acts immediately, by 
the time the new information is available to the market, 
the financial structure can be adjusted to maximize the 
value of the firm, given the new level of business risk. 
This means the value of the firm will fall, but only to Vfm 
which will always be greater that Vfm'• 
Time ~ in Changing the Financial 
Structure 
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Changes in the level of debt of the firm cannot be made 
instantaneously. There is a time lag between the perception 
of the non-optimal debt level and the necessary change. This 
lag in changing the financial structure can be greater than 
one year, or at least not be recorded on annual data for a 
year or more. Since the data available were yearly data, the 
time periods in this study are considered to be one year. 
This time lag is influenced by such factors as the amount of 
time to make the decisions, to gain acceptance of the 
changes within the firm, to check for legal and regulatory 
problems, to engage and negotiate with an investment banker, 
and to fulfill SEC requirements. 
The time necessary to make changes in the financial 
structure is also influenced by the method used to change 
the financial structure. If the financial structure is 
changed by selling new stocks or bonds, the time 
to make the change will be longer because of 




repurchased, some length of time will be necessary to carry 
out the repurchase. If debt is paid off using available 
cash, the time necessary could be short. In any case, 
management must allow some time for the change in financial 
structure. 




managers face a difficult problem in making 
the financial leverage. Assume that the 
management makes a change in the financial structure of the 
firm at a point in time "x" in order to maximize the value 
of the firm, given the business risk of the firm at time 
"x". By the time the change in the debt level is completed, 
the business risk of the firm could have again changed. 
Consequently, the management would end up chasing a optimal 
debt ratio. However, by the time the new financial structure 
is implemented, the financial structure could be optimal 
only for the business risk of the firm in a prior period. 
Rather than doing this, managers begin the process of 
changing their financial leverage at time "x", attempting 
to move to a financial structure that will maximize the 
value of the firm in the future, based on an estimated level 
of business risk in the future. Managers must make 
decisions, at time "x", about the level of debt that will 
maximize the value of the firm in the future, at time "x + 
f ", given the future business risk at time "x + f ", because 
of the time required to change debt levels. The time period 
"f" is dependent on the process used to adjust the debt 
level, the condition of the financial markets at that time, 
and the speed with which the firm can make and implement a 
decision. 
Information Content of Financial 
Structure Changes 
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There is an additional reason that management may 
change debt levels prior to anticipated changes in business 
risk. Ross (73,74) and Leland and Pyle (52) suggest that 
managers may be using the change in debt level to "signal" 
some information to investors and the market about the 
anticipated situation of the firm. While the market uses all 
publicly available information in estimating the future 
value of the firm, "insider" information cannot be released 
because of the risk of alerting competitors. 
Managers can, however, "signal" something about the 
firm's future by announcing f.inancing plans and starting to 
carry them out. Managers give "honest" signals because it is 
in their best interests to do so. If managers attempt to 
"signal" dishonestly (i.e., issue a security to mislead the 
market), the cost to them is quite high, for their wealth is 
tied to the wealth of the firm through stock options, 
bonuses, and other agency costs that will affect their 
compensation. In addition, if managers signal dishonestly, 
they will lose creditability with the market and therefore 
limit their ability to use the market to signal in the 
future. 
Summary of the Theoretical Model 
In summation, if the managers of the firm are to 
maximize both the wealth of the shareholders and themselves, 
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they will change the financial structure, based on estimates 
of future changes in business risk of the firm, in order to 
maximize the value of the firm in the future. Since it is 
impossible to make instantaneous changes, because of the 
time lag necessary to make such changes in financial 
structure, - managements begin the process of adjusting the 
debt level at a point in time "x", so that at a future point 
in time "x + f" the financial structure will maximize the 
value of the firm at time "x + f ". This means the management 
must estimate at time "x" the business risk of the firm at 
time "x + f ". 
Management is in the best position to estimate the 
business risk of the firm at time "x + f II because the 
managers has available "insider" information on both the 
future sales of the present products of the firm and the 
relative value and timing of the future projects the firm 
has the option of undertaking. It is also possible that 
managements use these changes in financial structure as a 
"signal" to the markets of the future prospects-of the firm, 
thus giving the market "insider" information without giving 
competitors important specific information. 
Developing Empirical Backing 
The Hypotheses 
The theoretical model developed above hypothesized that 
there is a relationship between debt and business risk, that 
the relationship is across periods (defined as one year in 
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been developed using a time series model. The t'lf!O 
hypotheses tested are as follows: 
Hypothesis I: The debt level changes of a firm are 
strongly correlated with the changes in business risk of the 
firm. 
Hypothesis II: The changes in debt level of the 
firm occur prior to changes in business risk3. 
The first hypothesis is concerned with whether there is 
a relationship between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. To test this hypothesis, a correlation model 
is used to ascertain whether there is a relationship between 
changes _in debt and changes in risk. The second hypothesis 
is concerned with whether the relationship between changes 
in debt and changes in business risk is leading or lagging. 
To test the second hypothesis, the timing of the significant 
relationships is analyzed. 
Assumptions 
In developing an empirical model to test relationships 
over time between changes in debt and changes in business 
risk, several assumptions were necessary. First, it was 
assumed that there is some time delay in carrying out a 
change in debt level. Second, it was assumed that the amount 
3 Since the empirical model is concerned with changes in 
debt levels and changes in business risk, the relevant 
correlation is between changes in debt and business risk 
between year end accounting reports. Thus, if the debt level 
of a firm changes during the time period from t 0 to t 1 , then 
it is hypothesized that business risk will change at some 
future time, for example, between t 1 and t 2• 
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of time necessary to effect this change was not constant 
within any firm or any industry. This time to adjust debt 
levels, defined above as -"f ", was dependent on such factors 
as the state of the economy, the method used to effect the 
change in debt level, and the particular situation of the 
firm at the time of the change. Third, it was assumed that 
management consistently attempts to maximize the value of 
the firm, using, as possible, changes in debt level. 
Overall View of the Model 
The empirical model tests for significant correlations 
between changes in business risk and changes in debt level 
across time periods. It is hypothesized that there is a 
leading relationship between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. This type of relationship would suggest that 
managers use their information to estimate the future 
business risk of the firm and begin to adjust the debt 
level to maximize firm value, based on the estimated future 
business risk. 
The model was used to test six different relationships 
between changes in business risk and changes in debt level. 
Because the data available were annual data, a point in time 
(t) is defined as one year, so that (t-3) refers to a point 
in time three years prior to ( t). The six relationships 
tested were: 
1. Changes in Debt (t-3) with Changes in Risk (t) 
2. Changes in Debt (t-2) with Changes in Risk (t) 
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3. Changes in Debt (t-1) with Changes in Risk (t) 
4. Changes in Debt (t+l) with Changes in Risk (t) 
5. Changes in Debt (t+2) with Changes in Risk (t) 
6. Changes in Debt (t+3) with Changes in Risk (t) 
with the figure in parentheses indicating the relative 
timing of the change. 
The Sample 
The data used in the empirica~ tests are annual data 
from Compustat for the twenty years from 1959 to 1978. The 
firms are predominantly from the manufacturing sector. The 
firms were screened in several ways. First, all firms have 
"pure" debt and "pure" equity. Pure debt is defined as debt 
that is not convertible or "quasi-debt," such as leasing. 
Pure equity means that only one class of common stock has 
been issued. This definition avoids problems of 
classification of hybrid and convertible issues. 
The second screening required all firms to be large. 
All firms in the sample are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Standard and Poor's 400 Industrial Index. 
This requirement ensured that the firms had access to major 
financial markets. 
The final screening required that all firms show a 
consistent profitability during the twenty years used in the 
study. This profitability requirement ensures that the firms 
in the sample have consistently positive cashflow. 
This sample used to test the hypotheses is critical to 
the empirical model. It is hypothesized that managers 
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estimate the future business risk of the firm and, acting on 
this information, change the debt level of the firm to 
maximize value. This hypothesis assumes that,generally, 
managers of firms in the sample are correct in their 
estimates of future business risk, are able to correctly 
decide the debt levels that maximize value, and are able to 
implement their decision. Miller and Modigliani (62) 
assumed that the market forces all firms to adjust to an 
optimal debt level. While there are no studies that have 
investigated possible debt optimization differences between 
firms, it is assumed that firms that consistently generate 
positive cashflows are better able to optimize the value or 
the firm by using debt since these firms will have a higher 
probability of producing the minimum cashflow s necessary to 
service the debt. Because of the lower risk of default by 
these firms, these firms have the widest range of debt 
levels open to them. Further, it is assumed that firms that 
consistently generate positive cashflows are, in part, 
generating these consistent, positive cashflows because 
management in these firms is better able to estimate the 
future. These firms are able to attract the best management 
because of their higher and more consistent profitability. 
Firms with positive cashflow are better able to 
optimize the value of the firm through debt policy because 
of the wider range of options open to them. Since the 
probability of bankruptcy is less with consistent, positive 
cashflows, firms in the sample should be best able to 
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implement optimal debt policy. 
Hong and Rappaport (46) have defined insolvency as a 
state in which a firm's operating cash flows are inadequate 
to meet contractual debt obligations. In valuing a firm, 
Hong and Rappaport added an insolvency term to the Miller 
and Modigliani (64) formula for valuation in a world of 
taxes and no bankruptcy costs. The original Miller and 
Modigliani formula was 
v = (X (1-T) /ke) + (TknD/ko) (4) 
where X = the expected (perpetual) before tax operating 
cashflows 
T = the firm's tax rate 
D = market value of the firm's debt 
ke =capitalization rate for the cash flows of an 
unlevered firm 
k0 =capitalization rates for interest payments 
rates on debt. 
Hong and Rappaport assumed that the insolvency cost is 
related positively to financial leverage, given some annual 
operating cashflow distribution. This insolvency cost was a 
function of the debt level, the mean of the cashflows and 
the standard deviation of the cashflows. Hong and Rappaport 
defined this insolvency cost as 
kr = f(D,X,s) (5) 
where D = debt level 
X =mean of cashflows 
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s = standard deviation of cashflows. 
This k1 is the cost of insolvency per unit ox debt. The 
Miller and Modigliani formula, using the Hong and Rappaport 
adjustment for bankruptcy costs, becomes 
v = (X (1-T)/ke) + TD - krD (6) 
The implication from Hong and Rappaport is that firms 
with lower and more risky cashflows can not support higher 
debt levels. This restriction on their debt levels could 
prevent firms from undertaking a more optimal debt level 
because of these bankruptcy costs. While it has not been 
shown that the optimal debt level for a particular firm lies 
outside the set of possible debt levels for a firm, given 
its cashflow characteristics, it is assumed that firms with 
more consistent, positive cashflows have greater freedom to 
pursue optimal debt levels. 
A second assumption regarding the relationship of 
positive cashflows and the ability of management to better 
predict future cashflows appears reasonable as firms that 
have consistently positive cashflows can hire better 
management. No specific studies have shown that firms with 
consistently positive cashflows hire management that is 
better able to predict future business risk, but such a 
relationship appears reasonable. 
As a result of these two assumptions, a sample was 
selected that minimized the probability of bankruptcy and 
maximized the probability of having superior management. 
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While it is not assumed that managers of the firms in the 
sample always made correct estimates of business risk and 
always made the optimal debt level decision, it is assumed 
that managers of the firms in the sample would be most 
likely to make good estimates of future business risk, to 
make good decisions regarding optimal debt levels, and to 
have the maximum range of debt level options open. 
The Use of Changes in Debt and.Changes 
in Risk 
The empirical model concentrates on changes in debt and 
changes in business risk rather than absolute values because 
it is assumed that management attempts to maximize value of 
the firm at all times. The debt level that maximizes value 
is dependent on cOnditions in the company and the 
environment at that time period. Thus, the optimal debt 
level or ratio for a firm could vary from year to year. This 
assumption means that management uses all the information 
available to optimize the debt level of the firm. Hence, the 
only time management will change the debt level is when new 
information re-defines that optimal debt level. This means 
that the driving force for change is new information. Only 
when this new information affects the optimal debt level for 
the firm will there be a change in the debt level. The 
driving force is change and, hence, the model must define 
the relationship of debt and business risk by evaluating the 
relationship between changes in debt and changes in business 
risk. 
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The Reasons for B Time Series Model 
The empirical model is designed to allow investigation 
of the relationship of changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. It has been assumed that changes in debt 
1 eve 1 r eq u i re some t i me "f ", w hi ch i s not n e c es s a r i 1 y 
constant either between or within firms. This time required 
between the perception of the need to adjust the debt level 
and the actual recording of the change in debt level on the 
firm's balance sheet could extend over more than one period. 
This lag in the recording of changes in debt levels is 
in part the result of the utilization of yearly data and in 
part the result of the non-constant time "f" required to 
actually carry out the change. As an example of this 
problem, assume that a firm, using a calendar accounting 
year, decides to change the optimal debt level (debt/total 
assets) of the firm in September, 19Xl, by selling a new 
issue of debt. By the time the debt issue is actually 
recorded on the year end balance sheet, possibly fifteen 
months have passed, since it would be very difficult to 
carry out a new issue in time to record the issue on the 
balance sheet for 19Xl. However, if the same change in debt 
level was made by buying back stock from one large investor 
using available cash, it is possible that the change in the 
debt level could have been recorded in 19Xl rather than 
19X2. In both cases, the debt level would have changed in 
the same direction, but the time of recording would be one 
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period different. 
It is apparent that these two different methods to 
affect a change in the debt level (measured by debt/total 
assets) would have differing effects on the overall 
riskiness of the firm. The major point, however, is that 
changing the debt level of the firm can be accomplished in a 
number of ways, and the time necessary to effect this change 
depends in part on the method used. Since the model is 
attempting to relate changes in debt and changes in risk 
and these changes in debt may be recorded in different 
periods than the decision, a time series model is necessary 
irrespective of the timing relationship between changes in 
debt and changes in business risk. Further, since it is 
hypothesized that there is a leading relationship between 
changes in debt and changes in business risk, a time series 
model is necessary. 
Development of the Business Risk Measure 
The risk measure is designed to measure changes in 
business risk while allowing for two adjustments to 
normalize the raw measure of business risk change. These 
adjustments are necessary because the management of a firm 
does not look at merely the raw change in the business risk. 
The management must also make allowances for the overall 
changes in the economy, and for what is a "normal" change 
within the company. This normal change is what past 
experience would indicate is a reasonable change in the 
operating income of the company. Any firm shows some 
34 
var ia ti on in its EB IT (earnings before interest and taxes) 
over time. This variation, usually measured by standard 
deviation, gives the management a range within which 
variations can be judged as normal or otherwise. Hence, the 
actual raw measure of the change in business risk must first 
be adjusted for the normal changes expected in business risk 
for the firm. 
The raw measure of business risk change is between year 
change in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). This 
measure was used for sever al reasons. Fir st, EB IT is a 
traditional measure of business risk. Second, the change in 
EBIT captures both changes in sales and changes in operating 
leverage. Finally, the use of changes in EBIT as a measure 
of business risk has been empirically tested and found to 
be a very strong indicator of business risk by Zumwalt and 
Shin (96). 
The change in EBIT risk was first adjusted for the 
normal business risk change expected in the firm. The raw 
measure of change in business risk, change in EBIT, was 
adjusted using the standard deviation of the EBIT for the 
firm over the period. After the first adjustment, the risk 
measure becomes 
RMt · = ,1 (EBITt,i - EBITt-1,i) I S.D.i (7) 
where RMt,i = risk measure for time period t for firm i 
S.D.i = standard deviation of EBIT for firm i over the 
twenty year period. 
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The resulting risk measure relates the amount of 
change in EBIT from one year to the next relative to a 
measure of "normal" change in the EBIT of the firm. This 
adjustment is made by using one standard deviation as a 
measure of the "normal" change experienced by the firm. 
This change in EB IT must al so be evaluated in terms of the 
rest of the economy. If all firms are showing a great 
increase in EBIT, then a larger than normal change for the 
firm may not signify any real change in the business risk of 
the firm. 
The second adjustment is to adjust for the changes in 
the economy and essentially "de-trend" results over the 
twenty year period. A ranking and differencing procedure is 
used. The change in EBIT, relative to the standard 
deviation, is ranked for each firm relative to all firms in 
the sample for each year. Hence, for each year there is a 
number assigned to each firm, based on the firm's change in 
EBIT, relative to its standard deviation of EBIT. The change 
in this number from one year to the next is the relative 
business risk change of the firm. The larger the change in 
EBIT, relative to the standard deviation of EBIT for the 
firm and relative to the changes in firms in the sample, the 
larger the relative change in business risk. 
These two procedures of ranking and differencing de-
trend the data by ensuring that the f irrn registers a change 
in business risk only if the level of EBIT changes relative 
to the normal changes expected for the firm, and relative to 
the changes in all firms in the sample. Hence, a firm can 
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show a change in business risk only if the change in EBIT is 
large relative to the standard deviation of thr EBIT of the 
firm over the twenty year period and this change is large 
relative to the changes in the EBIT of other firms. If all 
firms are showing a gain (or loss) in EBIT, then the ranking 
of any one firm which shows a change in EBIT will not 
change. A change in EBIT, even if it is large relative to 
the standard deviation of EBIT for the firm, may not be 
large enough to register as a change in business risk. If 
all other firms are also experiencing a large increase in 
EBIT (as in an upswing in the economy), then the change in 
the individual firm's EBIT will not result in a change in 
business risk measure. 
This numerical rank ordering of the firms in each year, 
dependent upon the ratio of the change in EBIT to the 
standard deviation of EBIT of the firm, has been tested by 
Zumwalt and Shin (96).They found that when rank ordered 
business risk variables were used, all ot the eight 
variables tested were significant in ANOVA tests of industry 
financial structure. When the raw variables were tested, 
only three of the eight variables were significant. 
In this manner, changes in business risk were developed 
for all firms over the twenty year-period • This measure of 
risk was not designed to measure exactly the business risk 
of a firm at a particular time. Rather, this measure is 
designed to indicate changes in risk for the firm, relative 
to the changes in risk that the firm would generally expect 
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and relative to the changes in other firms in the economy. 
The purpose of this risk measure is to integrate two 
sets of information used by the management to assess the 
business risk of the firm. The management uses the 
(estimated) performance of the firm and this performance 
relative to other firms to judge the business risk of the 
firm. 
Development .Q.f ~ ~ Measure 
Two different variables are used to measure the debt 
level. The debt level was measured using total debt as a 
percentage of total assets and long term debt as a 
percentage of total assets. Both of these measures were 
found to be significant indicators of differences in 
financial structure between industries by Zumwalt and 
Shin (96). Zumwalt and Shin tested the variables used by 
numerous earlier studies and their own study, using an ANOVA 
procedure to test for differences between industries. They 
found that total debt to total assets, as used by Ferri and 
Jones (32) and Remmers· et al. (71), and long-term debt to 
total assets, used in their own study, were consistently 
significant variables • 
. The change in debt level percentage (debt as a 
percentage of total assets) for each firm was used to 
measure the change in debt. This resulted in nineteen 
changes in debt measures for each firm for the :twenty-year 
period utilized in the study. 
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Correlation Method 
The two measures for each firm, the measure of change 
in risk and the measure of change in debt, were correlated 
using a Pearson product-moment correlation. Two sets of six 
different correlations were calculated for each company in 
the sample, using the appropiate leads and lags described in 
the section on the Overall View of the Model. The two 
different sets of correlations used two different measures 
of debt, long term debt to total assets and total debt to 
total assets. 
Results of the Empirical Testing 
The empirical testing generally supported the 
theoretical model. The majority of the firms (66%) showed a 
correlation between changes in business risk and changes in 
debt level at a 10% observed significance level. Of those 
firms that showed a correlation between changes in debt and 
changes in business risk, a large majority (69%) showed 
changes in debt leading changes in business risk. If the 
contemporaneous changes in debt level and business risk are 
included, over 90% of the firms showing significant 
correlations had leading or contemporaneous relationships 
between changes in debt and changes in business risk. 
While the empirical evidence is far from overpowering, 
the trend of anticipating risk changes and adjusting debt 
levels seems to be, at least weakly, supported. It would 
appear that firms do anticipate changes in risk and adjust 
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their debt levels in anticipation of these changes. Thus, 
both hypotheses, that there is a correlation between changes 
in business risk and changes in debt levels and that 
changes in debt levels tend to lead changes in business 
risk, have some empirical support. 
It is impossible to "see inside" a manager's mind and 
understand the motivations, variables and calculations that 
determine a particular manger ial decision. It is dangerous 
to blindly use the results of empirical study to estimate 
motivations, variables and calculations that make up that a 
decision. From the empirical results of this study, it 
appears that managers do make changes in the debt level of 
firms prior to changes in business risk. This type of 
behavior would suggest that managers are cognizant of the 
relationship of business risk and firm value and of the time 
necessary to make changes in debt and do make estimates of 
future business risk. These results also possibly support 
the hypothesis of Ross and Leland and Pyle that changes in 
debt are a signaling device, used by management to provide 
information to investors about the future of the company 




This chapter will present the theoretical and empirical 
literature relevant to the background of the present study. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, the chapter 
will provide a survey of the literature on financial 
structure, and second, the chapter will provide background 
and relevant arguments for both the theoretical and 
empirical models developed in this study. 
In the area of financial structure, a major problem is 
the conflict between the microeconomic (or firm level) 
approach to valuing debt and the macroeconomic (or market) 
approach to valuing debt. As discussed in Chapter I (pages 
2-4), the use of debt in the financial structure of the firm 
has an effect on both the size and standard deviation of the 
cashflows available to shareholders. Even prior to the 
seminal paper by Miller and Modigliani (62) in 1958, Durand 
(23), in 1952, had outlined three problem areas. 
1. What is the cost of the various methods of 
financing? 




3. Does the tax structure have any effect on the 
cost of financing? 
Durand assumed that any answers to these three 
questions would require a better understanding of security 
appraisal if the cost of capital was to be measured and 
would also require an analysis which was involved with 
maximizing wealth rather than income. Although now the 
former assumption is almost universally accepted, at the 
time, the problem was being approached from a viewpoint of 
maximizing income. An analysis that maximized wealth, while 
greatly compounding the difficulties of measurement, is more 
in line with modern studies and reality. 
The problem of security appraisal was approached by 
using a required return or capitalization method. This 
capitalization of income method had two approaches, a net 
operating income {NO!) and a net income (NI) method. The 
NO! method gave a lower value for the stock, for it assumed 
the existence of debt decreased the value of the firm. The 
NI method gave a higher value for the stock, for it assumed 
that the firm's value was not affected by debt as long as 
the firm used debt in a "reasonable" manner. 
Durand did postulate that a firm could increase its 
value through the use of debt and that there was some 
optimal debt level beyond which increasing debt reduced firm 
value. Durand also postulated that, since bond interest was 
tax deductible, the use of debt gave the firm a definite tax 
advantage. Durand felt that the key to the problem of the 
cost of capital was to devise a method of measuring the 
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value of securities. Durand postulated that only after the 
appraisal of securities was possible could the problem of 
cost of capital be defined and solved. 
Macroeconomic Approach to Valuation of Debt 
Miller and Modigliani (henceforth MM), in a series of 
papers (62), (63), (64), used a market approach to value 
firms and then attempted to solve the problem of the cost of 
capital, the effect of taxes, and the effect of debt on the 
value of the firm. MM's was a static model (in the sense 
that only cross-sectional data was utilized) which attempted 
to correlate cost of capital (estimated by using returns 
and market valuations of firm value) with debt levels (also 
estimated using market valuations of firm value). In the no-
tax case, MM postulated that a levered firm could not 
command any pr em im um over a debt-free company because 
investors could just as easily use "home-made" leverage by 
borrowing on their personal accounts to end up in the same 
risk and return position. 
MM, in their Proposition I, further postulated that the 
value of the firm is independent of its capital structure 
and this value is found by capitalizing its expected return 
at a rate appropriate to its risk class. This proposition 
implied that the value of a firm was strictly a function of 
expected income and risk class. 
This proposition also implied that the cost of capital 
of a levered firm was the same as for a unlevered firm. This 
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cost of capital was the capitalization rate of a pure equity 
stream of a firm in the same risk class. 
From this Proposition I, MM developed Proposition II 
which stated that the return on stock of a levered firm was 
equal to the appropriate capitalization rate for a pure 
equity firm of its class, plus a premium because of the 
increased risk of bankruptcy caused by the debt. 
Proposition .I 
MM developed their Proposition I by first assuming that 
all stocks earned a return equal to that of similar risk 
stocks. The value of the firm was the discounted value of a 
perpetual stream of income, using as a discount rate the 
proper rate of return for a stock of that class. Thus, for 
a firm which issues only stock, the value of the stock is 
determined by the required return for a stock of that risk 
class and the income stream available to stockholders. 
P(j) = X(j)/p(k) (1) 
where P(j) = the price of stock j 
X(j) = the expected return for stock j 
p(k) = expected rate of return for stock~ in class 
k. 
This is equivalent to 
p(k) = X(j)/P(j) 
where p(k) is a constant for all firms j in class k. 
(2) 
When firms issue bonds, the expected value of the 
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income stream will change because of financial leverage. 
But the amount of debt held will not affect the market value 
of the firm. MM postulated that in the no tax case, the 
market value of the firm is independent of its capital 
structure and is determined by capitalizing the expected 
return at the rate appropriate to its class. 
V(j) = S(j) + D(j) = X{j)/p(k) 
where V(j) =market value of the firm 
S(j) = market value of the outstanding stock 
D(j) = market value of the outstanding debt. 
(3) 
This valuation formula can also be expressed in terms 
of the average cost of capital, X(j)/V(j). 
x ( j) I ( s ( j) + D ( j) ) = x ( j ) /V ( j ) = p ( k) (4) 
Thus, the average cost of capital to any firm is 
completely independent of its capital structure and is equal 
to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of 
income of a firm in its class. 
Proposition ll 
From Proposition I, MM developed Proposition II, 
regarding the rate of return, i(j), on common stock of a 
levered firm. 
i(j) = p(k) + (p(k) - r) (D(j)/S(j)) (5) 
That is, the expected yield on a share of stock is 
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equal to the appropri~te capitalization rate, p(k), for a 
pure equity stream in the risk class, plus a premium related 
to the financial risk. This premium is equal to the debt to 
equity ratio times the difference between p(k) and the risk-
f ree rate (r). 
Theoretical Support Qf MM 
The great impact on the accepted ideas of corporate 
finance caused by MM's work resulted in further works of 
both a theoretical and empirical nature. The further 
theoretical work was mainly concerned with the validity of 
MM's assumptions and the conditions under which their proofs 
were developed. Stiglitz (83) enumerated five limitations of 
the MM proof. 
1. It depends on the existence of risk classes. 
2. The use of risk classes seemed to imply 
objective rather than subjective probability distributions 
over the possible outcomes. 
3. It was based on partial equilibrium rather than 
general equilibrium analysis. 
4. It was not clear whether the theorem held only 
for competitive markets. 
5. Except under special circumstances, it was not 
clear how the possibility of firm bankruptcy affected the 
validity of the theorem. 
Stiglitz showed that the MM theorem holds under far 
more general assumptions than MM required. In particular, 
Stiglitz showed (83) that, using a general equilibrium state 
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preference model, the MM theorem holds without the 
assumption of risk classes, competitiveness of capital 
markets, or agreement about the probability distributions of 
outcomes. Stiglitz also showed that MM's results may still 
be valid even if there are limitations on borrowing for 
individuals. Stiglitz did find however, that the possibility 
of bankruptcy still raised serious problems. 
Baron (5,6) showed, using a stochastic dominance model, 
that under certain conditions, the value of a levered firm 
may be greater than the value of an unlevered firm. However, 
under the general conditions of MM's model, MM's theorem is 
valid if all investors can borrow at the same interest rate 
as firms. 
Hirshleifer (44) used a time-state-preference model to 
show that under the idealized MM conditions, all possible 
ratios of debt are equivalent in market value. Where these 
conditions do not hold, there will be in general an optimal 
debt ratio. 
Fama (27, 28) showed that MM's results hold even if the 
holders of the firm's securities are unable to protect 
themselves from default risk. Fama and Miller labeled this 
default risk protection "me-first" rules. Fama showed that 
even with out "me-first" rules, in perfect capital markets, 
the firm's financing decisions have no effect on its market 
value and its financing decisions are of no consequence to 
its security holders. 
While many authors argued that MM's results were true 
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under the conditions stated, there was far from universal 
agreement. Both Solomon (81) and Lintner (53) disagreed with 
MM, using microeconomic-based arguments. Solomon argued that 
MM failed to incorporate the increase in the cost of equity 
as the debt level rose, re·sulting in their belief that the 
cost of capital is constant for any level of debt. Lintner 
argues from a marginal cost of capital standpoint that 
increased debt-financed investment will raise the value of 
the firm as long as the return on the investment is 
sufficient. 
Early Empirical Studies 
MM's theories on debt were based primarily on two 
studies by Allen (1) and Smith (80) and tested with 
empirical work they themselves did. While MM's contributions 
were mainly theoretical, it is important to understand the 
empirical method utilized by MM, both to appreciate the 
problems inherent in empirical testing in this area and to 
understand the design of the empirical model in this study. 
Further, many of the studies after MM utilized a similar 
method~! ogy. 
MM used data from 1947 and 1948 for electrical 
utilities and oil companies. Allen used data from 1947 and 
1948 from forty-three large electric .utilities to analyse 
the relationship between security yields and financial 
structure. Smith did a similar study using data from 1953 
for forty-two oil companies. 
MM's study used cross-sectional regressions to study 
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the correlations of the cost of capital with the debt ratio 
to test Proposition I. The cost of capital was approximated 
by: 
x = x ( j ) I /V ( j ) 
where x = cost of capital 
X(j)' =the return to firm j 
V(j) = the value of firm j 
(6) 
This was regressed against the debt ratio d, where d 
was defined as 
d = D ( j ) /V ( j ) (7) 
where D(j) =market value of the debt of firm j 
and V(j) = market value of the company. 
When MM regressed the cost of capital (x) against the 
debt ratio (d) they found that, for both the oil companies 
and electric utilities, the correlation coefficients were 
insignificant and of the wrong sign. This supported MM's 
Proposition I that the cost of capital was independent of 
the financial structure. From a microeconomic viewpoint, an 
increased debt level should have decreased the cost of 
capital to a point, and if the firms were prudent in their 
debt usage, it would be expected that the correlation 
between the cost of capital and increased leverage wo~ld 
lead to statistically significant, negative correlations. 
MM also empirically tested Proposition II by regressing 
the yield on common stock against the degree of leverage. 
Stock yield was approximated by net income to stockholders 
after taxes divided by market value of the common stock. 
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Leverage was measured using the market value of senior 
securities divided by market value of common stock. MM felt 
their results supported Proposition II as the y-intercept of 
the regression line approximated the required yield on the 
securities and the slope of the regression line approximated 
the required return minus the risk-free rate. The 
correlation coefficient was positive in both cases (for both 
the electric utilities and oil companies) and felt by MM to 
be highly significant (r=.53). 
Both Durand (21) and Weston (93) did similar regression 
studies using banks and utilities, respectively. Both found 
that their empirical results refuted MM's findings and both 
raised objections regarding possible mis-specifications of 
the cost of capital by MM. 
Weston postulated that MM's static model failed because 
it did not properly account for the correlation of leverage 
with other influences, such as growth, that change the gross 
relationship between cost of capital and leverage. Weston's 
model was very similar to MM's, but Weston used utility 
company data from 1959. Weston postulated that the years 
studied by MM (1947-1948) were years of low equity prices 
and high price/earnings ratios, and this particular data 
tended to skew their results. 
Durand, like Weston, used later data than MM. Durand 
utilized bank and utility data from 1955 and ran tests 
similar to MM's. Durand criticized MM mainly because of 
their reliance on perfect markets and used the restrictions 
on margin buying and the wide variance of stock prices from 
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book values as examples of imperfections in the market. 
Durand postulated, like Weston, that MM had not, in. 
their static model, accounted for growth and its effects on 
leverage and the cost of capital. Durand also empirically 
demonstrated that dividend payout ratios affected cost of 
capital, another area which MM felt should not affect the 
cost of capital. 
Durand regressed stock price against book value, 
earnings, and dividends and found that dividends greatly 
affected price, and thus, cost of capital. Durand also 
noted that the period studied by MM was an era favorable to 
bond financing. Durand postulated that the use of this data 
had two effects. First, it skewed MM's results, and second, 
it was evidence of the problems of cross-sectional analysis 
as opposed to more dynamic models spanning different types 
of markets. 
Using models similar to MM's, but with different data, 
Durand and Weston obtained empirical results opposite to 
MM's. Durand thought that MM's differing results could 
be due to their static model. In addition, both Durand and 
Weston thought that the unique period utilized by MM in 
their empirical work could have skewed their results. 
Masulis also questioned MM's statistical methods, noting 
that since only regulated firms were examined, the empirical 
findings might have been the result of the. regulatory 
environment of the sample. 
In the present study, the empirical model uses data 
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from a twenty year period and investigates the cross-period 
relationships of business risk and debt level. This use of a 
multi-year data sample and a dynamic model should avoid the 
criticisms of MM's empirical work by Weston and Durand. 
Further, since the data sample is from non-regulated 
industries, the problem suggested by Masulis should be 
avoided. 
Eguivalent Risk Class Testing 
MM also postulated that firms belonged to a risk class 
which defined the proper discount rate for the firm. 
However, attempts to find some grouping that approximated 
MM's concept of risk classes have been generally 
unsuccessful when other than very broad groupings are made. 
MM's concept of distinct risk clases was tested in four 
studies which resulted in two opposing views. By using an 
analysis of variance procedure, two of the studies confirmed 
MM's concept of risk classes having unique financial 
structure. However, Wippern (95) showed a flaw in the use 
of analysis of variance, which resulted in his postulating 
that the concept of risk class, at least as evidenced in 
different financial structures, was invalid. In addition, 
the study by Remmers et al. (71), using analysis of 
variance, found no support for MM's risk class concept in 
either the United States or in five industrialized foreign 
countries. 
Schwartz and Aronson (76), Scott (78), Wippern (95), 
and Remmers et al. (71) employed analysis of variance tests 
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on debt level measures and estimates of business risk to 
test whether the mean of the business risk or financial 
structure variables were significantly different between 
industries. 
Schwartz and Aronson used the mean of the common equity 
to total ~sset ratio of iirms in four broadly defined 
industry groups, assuming some direct linkage between a 
firm's financial structure and its business risk. They found 
that there were significant differences in the mean of the 
equity to total assets ratio between industries and 
insignificant differences intra-industry. 
Scott (78) used the ratio of book value of equity to 
total assets to m~asure financial structure. Scott expanded 
the work of Schwartz and Aronson by using ten industrial 
groups rather than just four and by using data from ten 
years rather than just two years. Scott, using analysis of 
variance, found that there was greater variance in financial 
structure among groups than within groups. This finding 
lent support to Schwartz and Aronson's conclusions that 
firms in the same industries tended to develop similar 
"optimal" financial structures. 
Remmers et al. (71), also used analysis of variance 
procedures on firms from five different industrialized 
countries to test the assumptions that industry 
classification can be used as estimate of business risk. 
They also tested the sample for the effect of size on the 
debt ratios. Remmers first replicated Scott's study, using 
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firms in nine different industries from the United States 
for 1966, 1970, and 1971. Using a larger sample size (258 
firms in 1966, 319 in 1970 and 328 in 1971), they found no 
support for Scott's findings. Remmers then tested industry 
as a determinant of financial structure in five different 
countries, using analysis of variance on debt ratios of 
firms in different industries within each country. Remmers 
found that industry and size were not determinants of 
financial structure in any of the countries for the years 
tested. 
Wippern (95) used a different measure of business risk, 
mean net operating income per share variability, and 
initially found evidence to support Scott's and Schwartz and 
Aronson's conclusion of a strong link between business risk, 
financial structure, and industry class. 
However, Wippern noted that analysis of variance, using 
an F-test to ascertain if means differ significantly, gives 
a total measure of difference, rather than shows whether the 
significant difference is due to all the means being 
significantly different from each other or is due to one or 
two means being significantly different from the rest. 
Wippern, using Schiffe' s test of multiple comparison, 
found that the significance of the F-test in the original 
analysis of variance was due exclusively to differences 
between the utilities industry and four of the eight 
industries in the sample. There were no significant 
differences between any of the other industries. 
Wippern concluded that there were no significant 
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differences between industry groups (with the exception of 
utilities) when using net operating income per share 
variability as an estimate of business risk. Wippern's 
conclusions are important for two reasons. 
First, Wippern's results suggest the possibility that 
the industries used by MM, Allen, and Smith were unique 
firms and that any results from studies of such firms are 
applicable only to regulated industries. Second, since 
there appears to be little difference between manufacturing 
industries in their financial structures, it is possible 
that the determinants of "optimal" financial str~cture are 
more closely tied to other factors rather than the industry 
of the firm. 
In the present study, industry classification is 
assumed to be, at best, of marginal importance in 
determining financial structure. For this reason, the 
sample used in this study is drawn from a wide variety of 
manufacturing industries. It is assumed that financial 
structure is a function of factors other than industry, and 
if indeed risk classes do exist, the determination of these 
risk classes is a far more complex relationship than 
industry grouping. 
The research detailed in this section highlights the 
problems involved in testing for the relationships of 
financial structure, valuation, and risk. The initial 
studies of Smith, Allen, MM, Scott and Schwartz and Aronson, 
using general classifications and one-dimensional risk or 
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debt measures in a limited number of years, provided clear 
cut results. However, when MM's theories were subjected to 
more sophisticated models spanning many years and different 
types of markets and employing larger samples, the results 
were found to be directly opposite to the earlier studies. 
Remmers, Weston, Durand, and Wippern demonstrated that if 
the classifications for industry were made less general, the 
studies expanded to more years of data, and the sample size 
increased, the theories of MM lacked empirical backing, at 
least in the sense of applying their basic, no-tax model. 
MM, however, realized that the existence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs greatly complicated the problem of the 
value of debt. The approaches to the question of the value 
of debt in a world with taxes are detailed, in the next 
section. 
Macroeconomic Approach With Taxes 
MM's original study assumed no taxes, but MM did 
postulate that the effect of taxes would be slight on their 
two propositions. MM surmised that the value of the tax 
deductibility of interest payments affected only the value 
of X(j). In a correction to their original paper (63), MM 
modified this view somewhat, showing that the tax advantage 
of debt financing is greater than originally assumed, but 
that the tax advantages are the only permanent value of 
debt. With taxes, X(j) becomes X(j)'. 
X(j)' =X(j)-r(D(j)) (1-t)+r(D(j) 
= q(t) + rD(j) 
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( 8) 
where q(t) = the after tax return net of taxes 
r = the cost of debt. 
The value of the levered firm, v (1), 
v (1) = X(j)'/p(t) = ( 1-t) x ( j) 
= v (u) + (r/p (t)) (tD ( j)) 
is 
I p(t) + tR/p (t) (9) 
(10) 
where t= tax rate 
x (j) = expected income 
p(t) = rate market capitalizes expected returns 
net of taxes f o.r; an unlevered company in 
class k 
V(u) = the value of a unlevered firm in class k 
r = rate at which market capitalizes a sure tax 
savings generated by debt 
R = interest cost. 
Proposition I becomes 
p ( k ) 1 = X ( j ) 1 /V ( j ) (11) 
and Proposition II becomes 
i(j) = p(t)/S(j) = p(j)' + (p(k)'-r)(D(j)/S(j)) (12) 
The after tax earnings yield becomes 
i(j) = X(j)'/ V(j) = p(t)-t(p(t)-r) (D(j)/V(j)) (13) 
This implies that the only effect of leverage on return is 
the tax deductability of interest payments. The value ot 
the firm is a function of both leverage (but only because of 
the tax savings of debt) and the expected returns as 
compared to an unlevered firm. MM postulated that if (3) and 
(4) did not hold between pairs of firms in a class, then 
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arbitrage would restore the stated equalities. · 
This postulated increase in value due to the tax 
deductability of interest ( or rather, the risk-free stream 
of future income from the tax shelter) implies that firms 
should use all debt, or very close to all debt, in their 
capital structure. While this high level of debt is 
approached occasionally by utilities, almost all 
manufacturing firms have a much lower level of debt than MM 
would suggest. In addition, the existence of higher tax 
rates should entice firms to use a higher level of debt. 
Miller (61) however, in comparing pre- and post World War II 
debt and tax levels, found no evidence that the higher tax 
rates of the post-World War II era were associated ·with 
higher debt levels. 
MM (64) suggested that firms do not use as high a level 
of debt as possible because of "the tax status of 
investors," "other dimensions (and kinds of costs) in real-
world problems of financial strategy," and "the need for 
preserving flexibility." MM readily admitted that their 
static analysis was unable to handle many of the 
complications of the real world, such as inter-period tax 
adjustments, carryforwards and carrybacks, and investment 
tax credits. These problems have been approached in a number 
of ways by later authors, who concentrate on two general 
areas, the cost of bankruptcy and the value of debt from a 
tax standpoint. 
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The Cost of Bankruptcy 
Hong and Rappaport (46) have identified two types of 
bankruptcy costs, direct and indirect. The indirect costs 
result from the problems of insolvency, where the firm 
cannot meet contractual debt obligations from the present 
stream of income. The firm must then raise the needed funds 
by other, probably sub-optimal, means. If the firm is unable 
to raise these funds to meet contractual obligations, the 
loss in value of the firm is the direct cost of bankruptcy. 
Hong and Rappaport postulate that the level of debt would be 
balanced with the possible costs of insolvency or 
bankruptcy. MM's equation for valuing the firm (using Hong 
and Rappaport's symbols) is 
where 
v = X(l-T)/ks + Tko D/ko ( 14) 
v = the value of the firm 
x = expected annual before tax cashf lows 
T = firm's tax rate 
D = market value· of debt 
ks = rate at which the market capitalizes the after-
tax cashflows of an unlevered company in the 
same risk class 
k0 = rate at which the market capitalizes interest 
payments on debt. 
Hong and Rappaport added a term to MM's equation to 
account for the insolvency cost function, assuming that the 
average insolvency cost is proportional to the probability 
risk of insolvency P(X<=Dk0 ). MM's equation then becomes 
v = X(l-T)/ks + TD - Dkr (15) 
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where kr = the average insolvency cost per unit of debt. 
Thus, at the optimal capital structure, the marginal 
tax benefits are exactly offset by the marginal insolvency 
costs. By differentiating equation (15) with respect to D, 
the value of the firm, at the optimal debt level becomes 
v = x (1-T)/ks + TD* - krD* (16) 
* where D = the optimal debt level. 
While Hong and Rappaport do not offer any empirical 
support of the above, Baxter (7) and Warner (91) did 
empirical studies that attempted to estimate the cost of 
bankruptcy. Baxter used personal bankruptcy data and found 
that the cost of bankruptcy was approximately twenty percent 
of the individual's assets. Warner, however, found that, 
when using data from a number of bankrupt railroads, the 
cost of bankruptcy was about one percent of the market value 
of the firm prior to bankruptcy. warner was careful to 
point out that the relevant cost of bankruptcy was the 
expected cost rather that the actual cost. Since the firm 
is unable to know ex ante the actual cost of bankruptcy, at 
best the firm would have to pick a level of debt that would 
assume some probability of bankruptcy. In any case, the 
expected cost for "reasonable" debt levels would appear to 
be rather low for larger firms. 
From a theoretical standpoint, Haugen and Senbet (42) 
also argued that bankruptcy costs were rather trival and 
that even liquidation costs have no effect on capital 
structure decisions. Haugen and Senbet disassociate the 
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costs of bankruptcy (the transfer of ownership to creditors) 
from the costs of liquidation (dismantling the unprofitable 
firm) and point out that liquidation is an independent 
capital budgeting decision. Haugen and Senbet argue that 
because prices in a competitive market reflect the actual 
value of the firm, bankruptcy costs must be trival and thus, 
bankruptcy costs do not have an effect on the optimal 
capital structure for a firm. 
Despite the work of Haugen and Senbet, it is generally 
assumed that bankruptcy costs have some effect on the level 
of debt utilized by a firm. From the standpoint of the 
empirical portion of this study, the probability of 
bankruptcy is minimized by the careful choice of sample. 
Rather than arguing for or against the importance or size of 
bankruptcy costs, this study assumes that for some subset of 
firms in the economy the existence or effect of bankruptcy 
costs is of minimal importance, for the probability of 
bankruptcy is slight. Since the probability of bankruptcy is 
slight, the effect of bankruptcy costs on optimal capital 
structure is minimal. This is not to say that bankruptcy 
costs are of no concern to managers of these firms. Rather, 
the choice of sample ensures that the managers of these 
firms have the greatest freedom from worry about bankruptcy~ 
Optimal Capital Structure 
The concept of an optimal capital structure has long 
been an accepted concept in finance. Numerous bond rating 
services and stock market reports regularly publish the 
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industry average debt ratios, implying that these ratios 
have some importance. MM's later work (64) in a world with 
taxes suggests that debt does add some market value to a 
unlevered firm. The exact level of debt, that optimal debt 
level that maximizes firm value, however, remains an area 
of dispute. Various attempts to group firms, for example by 
industry, into risk classes as suggested by MM have, as 
noted earlier, been unsuccessful. 
Robichek and Myers (72) used a state-preference 
framework to show that in a world with taxes,an optimal 
degre~ of leverage exists. Further, their argument does not 
depend on the "market imperfections" which are alleged to 
prevent the arbitrage process described by Modigliani and 
Miller. Robichek and Myers argued that several of MM's 
assumptions did not, in fact, hold in a world with taxes and 
that a optimal capital structure results from the balancing 
of the added value of debt to the firm and the disadvantages 
of debt , such as bankruptcy costs, to the firm. 
Kraus and Litzenberger (51) also used a state-
preference model to show that "the total market value of the 
firm is not in general a concave function of financial 
leverage." Kraus and Litzenberger postulated that the 
taxation of corporate prof its and the existence ot 
bankruptcy penalties are market imperfections that are of 
major importance to any theory of an optimal capital 
structure. 
Kim (48) used a mean-variance approach to show that a 
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firm's debt capacity, the amo~nt of debt the market would 
allow, is greater than the optimal debt level for the firm. 
This model showed that the value of the firm followed the 
"traditional" model where increasing levels of debt 
increased the value of the firm to a point where further 
increases in debt decreased the value of the firm. Moreover, 
this model showed that the traditional market value of the 
firms as a concave function with a global maximium holds in 
a capital market equilibrium framework. 
Turnbull (90) also showed that the traditional concave 
function of market value holds using a more rigorous closed 
form approach. Turnbull's results showed that the debt 
capacity of the firm, as allowed by the market, will be 
greater than the optimal debt ratio. 
Masulis (58) showed that the addition of debt tends to 
increase the value of a firm in an empirical study of issuer 
exchange offers and recapitalizations. This would tend to 
support the concept of an optimal capital structure. 
Scott (79) developed a multiperiod model of firm 
valuation with bankruptcy costs to show that a unique 
optimal capital structure exists for a firm. Scott's model 
assumed that the market for real assets was imperfect and 
that the value of a firm was a function of the expected 
future earnings and the liquidating value of the assets of 
the firm. A comparative statics analysis showed that "the 
optimal level of debt was an increasing function of the 
liquidation value of the firm, the corporate tax rate, and 
the size of the firm." 
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Brennan and Schwartz (12) approached the concept of an 
optimal capital structure by assuming the value of the 
levered firm was related to the value of an unlevered firm, 
which in turn they assumed to follow a Gauss-Wiener process. 
Using a differential equation similar to the option pricing 
model of Black and Scholes, and Merton,Brennan and Schwartz 
show that an optimal capital structure exists even if the 
tax savings due to interest deductability do not constitute 
a sure stream. 
Hamada (39) derived MM's three Propositions using a 
mean-variance approach, showing that the assumption of 
homogeneous risk classes and the MM arbitrage proof are 
unnecessary. In a later paper, Hamada (38) tested MM's 
results in an empirical study, showing that approximately 
23% of the systematic risk of firms is due to the use of 
debt and preferred stock. Hamada also found that MM's model 
of the effect of financial leverage better explained the use 
of debt by firms in their sample than the traditional view. 
Hamada's work tends to support the concept of an optimal 
capital structure determined by a maximization of value of 
the firm, within a mean-variance framework. 
Williamson (94) investigated the moral hazard effect on 
optimal financial structure, following the work of Myers 
(67). Williamson empirically tested whether firms would 
reject projects with a positive net present value because of 
their need for the use of financial leverage. Williamson 
showed that growth opportunites support less long term debt 
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than physical assets. This aspect of optimal financial 
structure, involving the composition and relative size of 
' 
the assets of the firm, has only recently been integrated 
into the question of capital structure. In the present 
study, the changes in capital structure are thought, at 
least in part, to be driven by changes in the composition of 
assets that comprise the firm. 
The above studies show that, in general, the concept of 
a optimal capital structure is accepted. While there remain 
arguments about how various disadvantages of debt offset the 
value of the tax deductability of interest, the concept of 
an optimal debt ratio, or range, has been shown valid using 
a wide range of financial tools and under a wide range of 
assumptions. What determines the actual optimal debt ratio 
is still a major question of finance. In the next section, 
some of the attempts to isolate the determinants of capital 
structure will be detailed. 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
As demonstrat~d in the previous section, the concept of 
an optimal capital structure for a firm is accepted by many. 
The question of what determines that optimal capital 
structure is not so well developed. The work cited earlier 
in the section on Equivalent Risk Testing showed that there 
does not appear to be a homogeneous grouping of firms by 
industry in terms of their capital structures. Much of the 
work in this area has involved empirical testing using 
either multivariate or multiperiod models. Since these 
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studies are important to the present study from both a 
theoretical and empirical standpoint, some discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of these types of models 
follows. 
Multivariate and Multiperiod Models 
This section will discuss the use of multivariate and 
multiperiod models that have been utilized in research of 
debt policies. While multivariate and multi-period models 
require more complex mathematical and statistical 
techniques, as pointed out earlier, the use of univariate 
measures in cross-sectional studies has resulted in 
conflicting results. Moreover, as shown in the preceding 
section, when these univariate models are expanded to larger 
samples and more rigorous group classification, the results 
become open to criticism, for these more rigorous univariate 
classifications ignore important interactions and 
influences. 
Just as univariate models do not capture interactions 
between different variables, single period or cross-
sectional models miss the effect of changes in earlier 
periods or of information available from forecasts made of 
later periods. These variables could have significant 
effects on decisions made about debt policies. 
The effect of variables in periods other than the 
present have a particular importance to debt decisions. 
Debt decisions are generally not recorded on accounting 
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records in the period in which they are made. Because of 
the time lag necessary to change the financial structure of 
the firm, in order to effectively relate the variables that 
differentiate firms' debt policies, it is necessary to look 
at variables in different time periods than that period in 
which the financial structure actually showed the change. 
Multiperiod models, however, suffer from many of the 
same problems that affect multivariate models. Because of 
these problems, particularly in regressions using lagged or 
leading variables, few studies have attempted to use 
multiperiod data in investigations of debt policy. 
Despite these problems, the importance of mul tiper iod 
inf o rm at ion on debt decisions r eq u i res that a mu 1 t i p e r i o d 
model be used. The methodology of the present study was 
chosen to avoid many of the problems of multiperiod models 
while still allowing for· inclusion of the effects of 
information in periods other than the period in which the 
financial structure change was recorded. 
In the next section, multivariate models and studies 
will be examined, and following that section, multiperiod 
models and studies will be examined. 
Multivariate Models 
Multidimensional or multivariate models attempt to 
capture the different effects that determine what is unique 
about a firm or a group of firms. Like univariate models, 
these multivariate models attempt to differentiate firms 
(and the behavior of these firms in such things as debt 
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policy). But since multivariate models use several factors 
to differentiate firms, it is necessary to have some 
systematic method to weigh the effect of different variables 
on the final grouping of the firms. 
Besides the weighting decision, the more basic problem 
of any multivariate model is the original choice of which 
variables are important in differentiating firms. To define 
the best variables to differentiate firms according to debt 
policy, this section will look at various studies on debt 
policy which used multivariate models. 
From these studies were drawn the variables used irt 
the present study to relate firms to specific debt policy. 
In particular, the studies of Zumwalt and Shin (43) found 
that EBIT volatility measures were significant predictors of 
financial structure if a rank ordering procedure was used. 
This section will explain the concept and usefulness of 
multivariate techniques, summarize some of the problems of 
their usage, and along with the results of these debt policy 
studies, detail three multivariate techniques used in these 
debt studies. These studies will be examined to better 
define which variables differentiate firms according to 
their debt policies. 
Concept .Qi Multivariate Models 
Multivariate techniques allow better grouping of 
members in a sample by assuming that the group can be 
defined as a function of some vector defined by independent 
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variables and some error term. Elton and Gruber (14) 
discussed the need for the disaggregation of economic data 
into meaningful groups to isolate firms that act in some 
sense in a similar manner, to hold some effect of an omitted 
variable constant, or to gain a homogeneous relationship 
between variables in a model. 
In the present study, the main concern is with the 
first use, that of grouping firms that may be expected to 
function in a similar manner with regards to their debt 
policies in response to changes in business risk. In part, 
this differentiation was done by careful sampling, selecting 
firms which were always profitable so that changes in debt 
policy would generally be guided by decisions to maximize 
value rather to avoid bankruptcy. This differentiation of 
firms was also accomplished by using variables which had 
been shown to be effective in dividing firms according to 
their debt policies. 
The variables that these studies showed useful in 
differentiating firms were utilized in defining the measures 
of debt usage and risk in the present study. The 
methodology utilized to relate these two measures was chosen 
to avoid many of the problems of multivariate and 
multiperiod models. 
The Problems of Multivariate and Multiperiod Models 
The major problem with multivariate models is concerned 
with the independence of the variables used to define the 
vector. Independence in a mathematical sense assumes that 
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variables are, in n-space, at right angles, or orthogonal, 
to each other. This problem of orthogonality, or rather the 
lack of orthogonality, is particularly acute in economic 
data, for economic variables tend to be interrelated. This 
lack of orthogonality leads to two major problems, 
particularly when multiple regressions are used. 
The two major problems faced in using multivariate 
models are multi-collinearity and auto-regressive 
disturbances. Multi-collinearity occurs when variables 
contain the same information. This essentially means that 
the variables are no longer perp·endicular to one other, and, 
hence, the results of using such variables are suspect. 
Auto-regressive disturbances can result from using lag or 
lead variables that cause a "lingering" effect, which, 
again, makes the results using such variables suspect. 
While there are numerous methods for correcting for 
these problems, the use of multiple regression must be 
approached with caution. The statistical problems involved 
are difficult to detect and cumbersome to correct and, even 
under the best of conditions, can lead to spurious results. 
In order to avoid the problems of multicollinearity and 
auto-regressive disturbances while still using multiple 
variables, researchers have turned to somewhat non-
traditional tools. In the area of financial structure, 
canonical correlation, maximium likelihood, and clustering 
analysis have been utilized to better define variables that 
most affect financial structure. 
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Canonical Correlation 
Canonical correlation was employed by Martin, Petty, 
and Scott (22), henceforth MPS, in attempting to assess the 
determinants of financial structure. MPS used Myers (28) 
hypothesis of an inverse relationship between a firm's 
financial leverage and its growth prospects. MPS developed 
a model to test Myer's hypothesis. The model stated that 
F = f (G,P,C,R,B) 
where F = a surrogate for corporate financial 
policy 
G = an estimate for the relative value of 
growth opportunities in relation to 
assets in place 
C = a measure of profitability 
R =a measure of importance of capital gains 
relative to dividend income for common 
stockholders 
B = a surrogate for the level of expected 
costs of bankruptcy faced by the firm. 
Since none of the variables were directly observable, 
"proxies" were developed to define the variables. To avoid 
problems of auto-regressive disturbances, the variables were 
defined in terms of time series data rather than using any 
lagged variables directly. 
Canonical correlation procedures "force" variables to 
be orthogonal but in doing so require the researcher to 
interpret the results somewhat, ratherthan observe the 
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effect of a variable directly. 
MPS found that non-industry variables performed better 
than industry specific counterparts in predicting financial 
structure. Industry specific variables were effective 
predictors, but not as effective as non-industry variables. 
MPS found that bankruptcy costs, profitability, and capital 
intensity were the best predictors of financial structure. 
Maximum Likelihood Procedure 
Taub (37) used a different methodology to estimate a 
firm's capital structure. Using a model somewhat like a 
multiple regression, Taub employed a maximium likelihood 
procedure to estimate the type of security a firm would use 
once it had decided to expand. Taub used two sets of 
predictor variables: variables that affect the firm's choice 
of financial structure directly, based on the firm's 
decision process under uncertainty, and variables that 
influence the firm's choice indirectly due to their 
influence on the firm's cost of issuing different 
securities. 
Because these predictor variables were grouped into two 
groups and the maximum likelihood estimation procedure was 
used, many of the problems of multiple regression were 
avoided while allowing the testing of several variables and 
combinations of variables on financial policy decisions. 
Taub's study attempted to predict a firm's behavior in 
issuing new securities by finding the most probable action 
given the firm's position relative to other firms, its own 
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history of decision making, and the cost of debt relative to 
the rate of return for the firm. 
Taub found that the size of the firm, and the 
differences between return to the firm and the long-term 
rates of interest were a positive influence on the firm's 
debt/equity ratio. Taub also found that the uncertainty of 
the firm's earnings had a negative influence on the firm's 
debt/equity ratio. 
Taub' s results are important · because they demonstrate 
that the financial structure of firms is affected by 
relative success and size (which relates to past success). 
Taub's results regarding the negative relationship between a 
firm's uncertainty and its financial structure suggest that 
any model attempting to relate financial structure and risk 
should account for both present rates of return and past 
variability of returns and their relationship to the 
experience of other firms. 
In a recent study (1982), Marsh (55) used an approach 
similiar to Taub's. Data from UK companies from 1959-1970 
were utilized in a regression model to determine the factors 
that influenced firms to issue either debt or equity. Marsh 
found that firms act as if they had target debt ratios and 
that these target debt ratios are functions of company size, 
bankruptcy risk, and asset composition. Further, Marsh found 
that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions 
and past security prices in deciding between debt and 
equity. 
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These results from Taub and Marsh are integrated into 
the model used in the present study. The present level of 
EBIT and a measure of the uncertainty of the stream of 
earnings are used in a relative ranking procedure. This 
procedure is designed to measure business risk both in 
terms of the historic experience of the firm and in terms of 
how other firms are doing relative to the present 
performance of the firm. Also, firms in the sample were 
both large and profitable, which, according to both Taub's 
and Marsh's study, meant that these firms should have 
maximum freedom to choose debt levels since the probability 
of bankruptcy is slight. 
Cluster Analysis 
Another multivariate method for grouping firms is 
cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is a technique which 
attempts to place similar objects within the same group 
based on a n-dimensional set of parameters. There are two 
main problems in the use of this technique. 
First, the sensitivity of the parameters used to 
measure similarity may vary because of differences in units 
of measurement and the parameters may be correlated, 
resulting in "double-counting." Generally, principal 
components can be used to avoid the problem of double 
counting. The problem of sensitivity is handled by careful 
scaling of the various measures used. 
Second, cluster analysis is an attempt to maximize 
between group variance and minimize within group variance. 
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It is a geometric technique, which, because of the 
impossibility of representing n-dimensional space 
graphically, relies on some algebraic logarithm to determine 
the number of groups and the relative parameters for group 
membership. Generally, studies using cluster analysis 
differ in the logarithm used, the parameters defining risk 
and debt levels, and the nature of the clustering. 
Clustering can be done in two ways, divisive and 
additive. The divisive technique divides the whole group 
into two parts, with the members of each group as different 
as possible in· terms of the cluster parameters. Then each 
group is again divided, attempting to include firms in a 
group most similar and ensure maximum dissimilarity between 
groups. This process is continued until some optimal number 
of groups is obtained, maximizing between group variance and 
minimizing within group variance. Ferri and Jones (16), 
henceforth FJ, used this technique to develop risk and debt 
cl asses. 
The second way to cluster is to start with the same 
number of groups as are in the sample. Each member of the 
sample is compared with all other members for similarity. 
The clusters are formed by combining the one member clusters 
based on similiarity. Thus, in a sample of ten objects, 
there would be originally ten clusters. If a member of one 
cluster were found to be sufficiently similar in terms of a 
set of multivariate parameters to another cluster, the two 
would become one cluster, and the total number of clusters 
75 
would now be nine. This process would continue until an 
optimal number of clusters is reached. 
This method, used by Martin, Scott, and Vandell (21), 
henceforth MSV, is best suited to prove the negative 
hypothesis of no similarity within groups. By the nature of 
its clustering, the additive method tends to result in many 
one member groups. 
Clustering analysis has several advantages and avoids 
some problem areas encountered with more traditional tools. 
Clustering allows the assessment of relative risk of a firm 
within the sample to be judged relative to the riskiness of 
all firms in the sample. Regression methods, besides the 
problems of multi-collinearity and auto-regressive 
disturbances, result in forcing firms into risk categories 
dependent on a preconceived notion of the appropriate risk 
measures. 
Clustering allows firms to be put into risk categories 
relative to the riskiness of other firms in the sample in 
that year, much as firms are judged in comparison to their 
relative riskiness in the marketplace. Clustering also 
avoids the problem of dealing 'with trends, for clustering 
looks at relative risk within a particular year. 
These advantages of clustering were incorporated into 
the mQdel used in this study. Because risk and debt data 
were used from a twenty-year period for firms, trends and 
changes in other firms in the sample would tend to distort 
risk and debt changes of a firm. 
In the model utilized in the present study, a ranking 
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procedure assessed the risk and debt changes in a firm 
relative to the changes in all other firms in the sample 
rather than just assessed that change relative to past 
performance. This procedure allowed data from twenty years 
to be utilized in trying to isolate what constitutes actual 
debt pol icy for these firms. 
While clustering would help isolate different behavior 
within a single year, if it were used to analyze data over 
several periods, the effect of trends could cause firms 
similar in their overall approach to debt to be placed in 
different groups if the proper category or categories 
defining debt policy were not properly utilized. Since 
these debt defining characteristics are what such a study is 
searching for, ex ante it would be hard to design those 
attributes to be used for clustering. 
Clustering does, however, point out the need for 
dealing with trends in analyzing time series data. The 
studies done with clustering also help define the factors 
which best measure business risk and also best explain 
differences in debt policy behavior. 
Ferri and Jones (16), henceforth FJ, and Martin,Scott 
and Vandell (21), henceforth MSV, used cluster analysis to 
develop relative risk classes, and, in the study by FJ, also 
to develop relative debt classes. FJ used the coefficient 
of variation in sales, the coefficient of variation in pre-
tax cashflows, the standard deviation of the standardized 
growth in sales, and the standardized growth in cashflows as 
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parameters to measure business risk and thus differentiate 
firms into groups. 
MSV used firm sales/industry average sales, variance in 
firm sales/share, variance of EBIT over variance of sales, 
compound growth of EBIT, covariance of industry and firm 
sales, and size of sales as their differentiating measures 
of business risk. 
Using these measures to cluster firms into groups, FJ 
found a slight relationship between debt structure and 
industry class~ had mixed results for size influence on debt 
structure for the two years studied, and found a linkage 
between income volatility and financial leverage. 
this linkage between income volatility and 
However, 
financial 
leverage was questionable because a basic condition for the 
discriminant tests had been violated. 
FJ also found that business risk, as measured by 
historic volatility in sales and cashflow, was a poor 
predictor of financial structure. 
MSV employed principle components as a further 
refinement to cluster analysis to avoid problems of multi-
collinearity, or double counting. Variables were formulated 
into two classes, environmental or firm specific, to cluster 
firms into risk classes. MSV found little support for the 
idea of equivalent risk classes. However, their study, like 
that of FJ, depended heavily on historical volatility of 
sales (both industry wide and firm specific), sales size and 
covariance of firm and industry sales~ 
While MSV and FJ found that sales volatil ty were poor 
78 
predictors of business risk, z umwal t and Shin (43), 
henceforth ZS, found that sales and EBIT volatility measures 
were significant predictors of financial structure if a rank 
ordering procedure was used. ZS postulated that absolute 
measures of business risk (i.e. without ordering) may not 
adequately discriminate differences between groups since 
extreme values might cause high standard deviations for 
groups and, thus, group overlap. 
The findings of ZS would suggest that using some 
measure of historical volatility to define groups, and then 
classifying firms by these groups would lead to mis-
specification and overlap of groups. It would appear that a 
better method to measure business risk ,one that would 
differentiate between firms, would be to utilize a measure 
of sales or EBIT volatility, adjusted to avoid problems of 
wide parameters of group membership by scaling the level of 
sales or EBIT by some measure of historical volatility. 
The findings of ZS show that sales and EBIT volatility 
were significant predictors of financial structure. To link 
business risk changes with debt structure changes, it is 
necessary to have a measure that shows both the volatility 
of either EBIT or sales relative to their respective 
historical volatility and also relative to the changes 
occurring in other firms in the sample. 
This need to relate changes in sales or EBIT to both 
historical volati~i ty and the relative experience of other 
firms is necessary to properly define membership in a group 
79 
according to business risk. 
A basic assumption of this study is that firms adjust 
their financial structure to optimize value. The financial 
structure will be adjusted only when the business risk of 
the firm changes. The manager can only judge the change in 
business risk of the firm in terms of the historical 
volatility of that firm and the changes in other firms. 
These multivariate studies are important, however, 
because these studies highlight some of the problems of 
using multivariate groupings to differentiate firms. The 
work of FJ, MSV, and ZS suggest that estimating business 
risk, at least in attempting to predict financial structure, 
is best done using a measure of EBIT or sales volatility. 
These studies also show, first, that historic measures 
of volatility have little predictive power and, second, that 
the grouping of firms using sales or EBIT volatility can be 
adversely affected by group overlap. This group overlap is 
possibily caused by differences within the groups leading to 
high deviations caused by extreme values, which results in 
wide and overlapping groupings which lack discriminating 
power. 
This section has detailed some of the attempts to use 
multivariate methods to better define and relate business 
risk and financial structure classes. While the studies 
have employed time series data in defining variables, the 
models generally were not dynamic in the sense of testing 
business risk changes in one period as a determinant of debt 
level changes in an earlier or later period. 
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Rather, these studies have used measures of historical 
volatility from several periods to predict debt levels in a 
particular period. The problems inherent in modeling the 
effect of changes in one period on decisions made about 
financial structure changes in other periods will be 
examined in the next section. In particular, the use of 
dynamic models, in the sense of using lagging or leading 
variables, will be discussed. The use of dynamic models is 
important because this study is concerned with the 
relationship of debt level changes and risk level changes 
across different periods. 
Multiperiod Models 
Multiperiod models assume that factors or variables 
from other time periods affect the decisions made in the 
present time period. While these models represent 
signif iciant mathematical and statistical difficulties, the 
inter-relationship of leading or lagging variables on 
present decisions is well accepted. This type of model is 
important to the present study because both the theoretical 
and the empirical models attempt to explain financial 
structure decisions by viewing the inter-relationships of 
changes in debt and changes in business risk across periods. 
Dhrymes and Kurz (19) developed a two-stage least 
squares model in an attempt to study the relationship 
between investment, dividend, and financing decisions. They 
attempted to use some lagged variables in their equations 
81 
but found that the problems of multicollinearity were too 
severe for meaningful results. 
Fama (29) used time series data to investigate the 
relationship between dividends and investment decisions and 
found no evidence to support the concept of interdependence 
of dividend and investment decisions. McCabe (59), noting 
some of the problems with Fama's study, developed a further 
version of Dhrymes and Kurz's model using lagged variables. 
Using an ordinary least squares model, McCabe showed that 
dividends have a negative effect on investment. McCabe 
concluded that there is strong evidence to support the 
interdependence of spending (investment and dividend) 
decisions and fund raising decisions (new debt or equity). 
Myers and Pogue (69) used a mixed integer programming 
model to relate investment and financing decisions to the 
risk of the firm and the risk of the projects undertaken. 
Specifically, their model tied debt capacity to project risk 
characteristics and not arbitrarily determined debt ratios. 
Myers (68) also developed a mathematical programming 
formulation of the interaction of financing and investment 
decisions which depended on lagged changes in variables to 
develop a model for optimal financing decisions. 
These studies, which demonstrated that non-
contemporaneous variables and risk are critical to 
understanding f inancihg decisions, are integrated into this 
study. This dynamic approach to understanding financial 
structure is further supported by Ang (3), who used a time 
series model to show that firms tend to act as if they were 
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aiming for some target debt ratio. Ang found that a simple 
partial adjustment model best explained firm behavior in 
adjusting debt ratios, with indications that firms adjust 
their debt behavior to anticipated future increases or 
decreases in assets. 
Taggart (88) used a flow of funds approach based on 
Federal Reserve data to empirically test how firms determine 
long-term debt capacity. Taggart postulated that firms 
adjust to permanent capital target levels rather slowly, 
implying that leading or lagged variables are critical to 
understanding financial structure decisions. 
Spies (82), using a complete partial adjustment model, 
with lagged variables, showed that long term investment 
adjusts to a new optimal level quite slowly. This time lag 
results in financing decisions being subjected to great 
uncertainty. Spies postulated that this uncertainty results 
in temporary financing being frequently utilized until 
longer term financing can be arranged. This concept implies 
that there is a significant time lag between changes in the 
firm and changes in the permanent financing. Spies' 
results, regarding the timing of financial structure changes 
and the change in business risk (which, at least as measured 
by changes in EBIT, would presumably show up after the new 
investment was in place), tend to support the timing 
relationship between changes in debt and changes in business 
risk hypothesized in this study. 
From the above studies, it is obvious that decisions 
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regarding financial structure are affected by non-
contemporaneous variables and that debt levels are adjusted 
slowly, over several time periods. This slow adjustment 
process and the effect of non-contemporaneous variables are 
used in the present study to form the basis for both the 
theoretical and empirical models. 
Alternate Approaches 
The question of optimal capital structure has generally 
been approached in a somewhat linear fashion, assuming that 
some particular factor, such as bankruptcy cost or market 
imperfections, is responsible for the particular level of 
debt that optimizes value. Recently, several alternate 
approaches have suggested that the level of debt that 
optimizes value for a firm may be the result of a more 
complex process. 
Myers (67) postulated that the level of debt that 
optimized value was the result of the value of two "bundles" 
of assets held by the firm. Myers postulated that the 
relative size and composition of these two "bundles", real 
assets and real options, determined the optimal level of 
debt. Real assets have market value independent of the 
firm's future investment strategy. Real options are 
opportunities to purchase real assets on possibly favorable 
terms. 
If the firm decides to invest in an option, the firm 
must raise money. If the firm issues what Myers calls "risky 
debt", the debt is backed mainly by the value of the 
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investment. If the option is found to have value less than 
the value of the debt, the shareholders must supply the 
difference. Myers shows that this "risky" debt affects the 
market value of firms differently depending on the the 
relative riskiness of a firm's options and its real assets. 
The impact of risky debt on the market value of the firm is 
less for firms holding investment options that are risky 
relative to the firm's present assets. In this sense, risky 
firms can borrow more than safe firms. 
This concept would also account for firms not borrowing 
"as much as possible." The debt level of the firm is 
affected by the relative risk of the future options as 
compared to the riskiness of real assets. Debt level 
changes, then, are influenced by the effect of the new debt 
level of the firm on shareholder wealth, rather than by the 
effect of some particular debt level on the total value of 
the f i rm. Thus, i t appears to be n e c es s a ry to 1 o o k at 
changes in risk for the firm in order to understand the 
resultant debt levels. 
This emphasis on changes in debt levels rather than on 
absolute debt levels is utilized in the present study. This 
is in part because of Myers' contribution and in part 
because of the lack of any standard to measure absolute debt 
level against over the twenty years studied. 
Myers postulated that real assets should be financed 
with more debt than growth opportunities. He also postulated 
that capital intensity, high operating leverage, and 
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profitability should be associated with heavy debt 
financing. These two concepts imply that growing, profitable 
manufacturing firms tend to make changes in their debt 
levels more frequently as options are turned into real 
assets. In the present study, the sample was picked to 
include mostly large, profitable, growing manufacturing 
firms in order to maximize the possibility of observing this 
changing of the debt levels as the composition and size of 
the real assets and options change in the firm. 
Since the value and possibly even the existence of 
options available to the firm are generally unknown to 
investors, firms face a problem in changing debt levels. 
The problem of making changes in debt levels when investors 
do not have the same information as managers has been 
approached by both Ross (73,74) and Leland and Pyle (52). 
Ross and Leland and Pyle suggest that firms use the change 
in debt level as a "signal" to investors that the firm is in 
the process of changing. In a later empirical study, Masulis 
(58) noted that his results supported the concept of debt 
level changes releasing information about changes in firm 
value. Heinkel (43) developed a theoretical model that 
supports the concept of capital structure relevance when 
asymmetrical information exists and that also supports 
Myers' argument that riskier, more valuable firms will have 
larger amounts of debt financing. 
In order for signals to be of use to management, the 
signals must be perceived by the market as honest, and they 
must not give away insider information. The critical point 
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to both Ross's and Leland and Pyle's argument is that for a 
signal to be perceived as honest by the market, the signal 
must be costly to managers if incorrect. Obviously, a move 
away from the optimal debt structure is costly to 
shareholders, and through "agency costs" mechanisms are made 
costly to managers. 
Jensen and Meckling {47} have pointed out that owners 
of a firm are willing to incur what they call "agency costs" 
to ensure that their "agent", the manager, acts in the best 
interest of the owners. The agency costs of concern for this 
study are compensation packages for managers. By proper 
structuring of these compensation packages, shareholders 
make wealth maximization for managers the same as wealth 
maximization for shareholders. These compensation packages 
ensure that poor decisions made by managers are costly to 
managers. Thus, agency costs ensure that managers, in their 
decisions, send signals that will be costly to themselves if 
incorrect. 
Signals from managers will also be honest because if 
managers attempt to influence the market in the short run 
with incorrect signals, they will lose the confidence of the 
market and lose their ability to influence market 
perceptions toward management perceptions of the value and 
risk class of the firm. The firms picked in the sample in 
this study are all firms which have a long history of 
profitability and have little to gain by attempting to 
"trick" the market for short term gain. 
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This concept of "agency costs" has also been forwarded 
as a possible constraint on both growth and the issuance of 
additional debt. Since there is an agency cost associated 
with issuing new debt, larger firms would be more likely to 
issue debt, because the agency cost of issuing debt would be 
a much smaller percentage of the total issue. For a smaller 
firm, agency costs could represent a substantial burden on 
the firm, effectively raising the interest cost and either 
making the project unprofitable or forcing the firm to use 
other, less-optimal methods of financing. In the empirical 
section of this study, the sample was selected on the basis 
of size in order to keep agency costs a very small 
percentage of total costs and total value, thus ensuring 
that managers of firms had maximium flexibility to make 
optimal decisions. 
These alternate approaches to estimating how debt level 
decisions are made are critical to the present study, for it 
assumes that agency costs represent a smaller percentage 
cost for larger firms (thus giving larger firms more 
flexibility in choosing financing instruments), that 
signaling is used by managers to inform the market of 
upcoming changes in the firm, and that debt decisions are 
tied to both the size and composition of the real assets and 
options held by the firm. 
Recent Work 
Much of the recent work has focused on the effect ot 
differential tax rates and the possibility of clientele 
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effects. This clientele effect results from different 
personal tax rates of investors, which means that investors 
in tax brackets higher than the marginal corporate rate 
pref er personal debt to corporate debt. Low income investors 
pref er corporate debt. 
Farrar and Selwyn (31) investigated this concept of a 
clientele effect. Using MM's basic tax-free model, they 
developed increa~ing complex models embodying increasing 
amounts of the actual tax code.· From their results, they 
concluded that actual tax rates tend to affect the value of 
the firm to different investors. They postulated that 
increasing leverage would make firms more attractive to 
lower income investors, while firms with lower leverage 
would attract larger shareholders whose portfolios contain 
considerable private leverage. 
Elton and Gruber (25), investigating the effect of 
dividends and corporate investment policy on shareholder 
wealth, found that definite clienteles exist for particular 
firms, a reflection that firms not only attract a clientele 
but they also attract a rational clientele. 
Miller (60) argues that financial leverage is 
irrelevant to any given firm in a world of differential 
personal taxes. He postulated that the combination of the 
marginal personal tax disadvantge of debt and supply side 
adjustments by firms would reduce the corporate value of 
debt and would also drive market prices to equilibrium. 
From the supply-side, Miller postulated that firms 
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would not off er debt because the interest rate necessary to 
attract investors would be too high to benefit the firm, 
even with the tax-advantage of debt. Further, if the firm 
uses all of its income to re-invest in the company, the 
shareholders are moved from ordinary income to capital gains 
income. Thus, the cost of using debt, from a shareholder's 
perspective, is very high. Any tax advantage to debt is 
cancelled out by the need to pay higher rates to sell bonds, 
given that bonds have higher ordinary tax rates than 
equity's capital gain rate. The only time debt will be 
issued is when it helps the wealth of owners. This will only 
happen when bond rates are unusually low. 
Miller's argument depends a great deal on the concept 
of clientele effects, where the tax rate of investors 
differentiates the different clienteles. Kirn (49) thought 
these clientele effects tended to reduce the effect of tax 
benefits on capital structure. Kirn further pointed out that 
from a mean-variance portfolio standpoint, the benefits of 
investing in firms where the leverage level of the firm 
maximizes after-tax income to the investor may be outweighed 
by the losses of portfolio efficiency. 
Kirn, Lewellen, and McConnell (50) conducted empirical 
tests of this leverage clientele hypothesis and found the 
results somewhat mixed. They found a statistically 
significant relationship between corporate leverage policies 
and investors' tax rates, but the magnitude was much less 
than the theory would predict. 
This work by Miller brought forth numerous studies 
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attempting to show the value of debt to the firm, in 
particular emphasizing the tax issue. Taggart (89) found 
that as Miller had postulated, the tax advantages of debt 
were less than previously supposed. However, by 
reintroducing debt costs, Taggart showed that capital 
structure was not a matter of indifference to firms. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (18) extended Miller's model to 
include more realistic estimates of the corporate and 
personal-tax rates using a two date state-preference model. 
They found that the existence of corporate tax shields, such 
as depreciation deductions or investment tax credits, is 
sufficient to overturn the leverage irrelevancy theorem. 
From this, they postulated that each firm has a unique 
interior optimal leverage decision due solely to the 
interaction of personal and corporate tax treatment of debt 
and equity. 
Harris, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (40) used a generalized 
personal and corporate tax (PACT) model to empirically test 
the effect of personal tax on corporate capital structure. 
On average, they found that personal tax effects off set 
almost half of the corporate tax incentives associated with 
the use of financial leverage. They also found that there 
were significant differences between firms in terms of the 
value of debt to them, and one-fifth of the firms maintained 
an average personal tax ratio implying a net tax advantage 
for the use of additional equity. Further, it was found that 
substantial tax incentives for the use of debt exist for 
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many other firms. These incentives for change in financial 
structure from a personal tax standpoint would imply firms 
should change their financial structure. However, since few 
changes were noted over a nine year period, it appears that 
other significant factors precluded these changes suggested 
from the personal tax aspect. 
Cordes and Sheff rin (16) attempted to estimate the 
effect of increasing interest costs on the value of the 
firm, holding constant all other income statement items and 
investment and production decisions. Their results supported 
DeAngelo and Masulis (18) in regard to the effect of 
additional interest payments reducing the ability of the 
firm to effectiely use nondebt tax shelters, thus implying 
an optimal capital structure for each firm. Further, Cordes 
and Sheffrin found a significant difference in the after-tax 
marginal cost of capital between firms. 
Modigliani (66) used a mean-variance approach to show 
that leverage is valuable, but if the market regards the tax 
saving flow as subject to risk, then the value of debt would 
be low. Further, he postulated that differential rates of 
taxation will result in a clientele effect. 
This recent work on the effect of different tax rates 
on the value of the firm demonstrates the continued lack of 
consensus on the value of debt. This work on the demand side 
of debt, while important, is not particularly relevant to 
the present study. This study is concerned with the timing 
of the supply of debt by firms, and its relationship to the 
business risk of the firm. 
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The work of Miller (60) on the supply-side, however, is 
of importance to the present study. Miller notes that 
generally the rate necessary for firms to sell debt will be 
higher than the rate at which debt is of value to the firm. 
While this may be true on average, the rates for firms at a 
particular time vary considerably, as evidenced by the 
different bond ratings of firms. Thus, it is possible that 
on average debt may not be of value to all firms, for 
specific firms with lower rates (due to their strong bond 
ratings), debt may be of value. Further, larger firms will 
have smaller {in terms of percentage) agency costs for 
issuing debt, making their effective cost of debt lower. 
Miller notes that debt can be of value to firms if it 
can be issued below some rate. To attract more investors 
r eq u i r es that the corporation pay hi g her rates. M i 11 er 
argues that as a result of these higher rates, there will 
exist an equilibrium level of aggregate corporate debt but 
no optimal debt ratio for individual firms. While this may 
be true on average, or even on the margin in the aggregate, 
from the viewpoint of the individual manager, since debt can 
have value to the firm, managers will take advantage of 
these opportunities to increase value. The possibility of 
increasing value through issuing debt will be highest for 
those firms which can issue debt at the lower rates. 
Conclusion 
From the works cited above, several areas can be seen 
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as critical to this question of debt level. Bankruptcy and 
agency costs seem to be important in determining an optimal 
capital structure. The value of debt is closely tied to the 
effect of taxes, both corporate and personal. In order to 
gain value from the tax shield of debt, the firm must 
produce sufficient income. The cost of debt is important to 
firms, for this determines whether debt has value to the 
firm. This importance of cost also implies the the timing of 
debt issues is critical, for rates vary considerably over 
time. 
There are several important implications for the 
present study. Fir st, bankruptcy and agency costs are 
relative. All firms face them, but for some firms, these 
costs are relatively minor, since the probability of 
bankruptcy is slight and the relatively fixed nature of 
agency costs makes them minor for larger firms. The ability 
to use the tax shield is dependent on firm income, and more 
successful firms have the greatest probability of using the 
full value of the tax shield in the future. 
A further implication of the above study is that debt 
may have additional uses to the firm, such as signaling. The 
changes in the capital structure of the firm may be a method 
for managers to alert investors of upcoming changes in the 
firm. These changes could be due to changes in the assets in 
place of the firm or to changes in the options available to 
the firm. 
CHAPTER III 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
Introduction 
The Problem 
There remains in financial literature, and in the minds 
of practitioners and academicians, a fundamental conf 1 ict 
concerning the value of debt to the firm. From a 
microeconomic, or firm level, the lower cost (relative to 
equity) and the tax-deductibility of interest make debt 
valuable to the firm. Hence, firms that utilize debt should 
show superior returns to shareholders and thus command a 
superior price in the market place. Empirical evidence 
supports this view, in the sense that most firms do utilize 
some debt. From the amount of attention paid to debt ratios 
by financial analysts and bond rating services, the actual 
level of debt appears to be of some importance. 
However, from a macroeconomic basis, debt either has 
little importance according to MM (62), in the case of no 
taxes, or is of maximum importance in a world with taxes 
as pointed out by Modigliani (66). This importance of debt 
in a world with taxes imp1ies that debt should be used 
almost ex cl us i vely for funding by firms. Au th ors after MM 
have attempted to use market imperfections, such as 
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bankruptcy or agency costs, to explain this lack of 
agreement between the macroeconomic view and the 
microeconomic view, and the lack of agreement between either 
viewpoint and the empirical evidence of the marketplace. 
The present study presents a theoretical model which will 
address several of the major questions in this area of 
financial structure. 
1. Why is there no recognizable, common strategy 
for debt usage? 
2. Why are some firms able to approach the level 
of debt estimated by microeconomic theory to be optimal, 
while other firms seem unable to utilize debt very well? 
3. Why have earlier empirical studies been unable 
to ascertain the relationship between risk and debt level? 
4. How do market imperfections affect the ability 
of the firm to utilize debt? 
Prior to the presentation of the model, a discussion of 
several of the important market imperfections and attributes 
of debt is in order. 
The Cost and Value of Debt 
The costs of debt, beyond the actual monetary cost of 
interest, have been generally viewed as market 
imperfections. If these market imperfections did not exist, 
then firms would use far more debt than usually employed. 
That is, in a world with taxes, if there were no risk ot 
bankruptcy or financial distress from too much debt and no 
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issuing or agency costs, then firms would make maximum use 
of the lower cost and tax shelter effects of debt. Thus, in 
the absence of these market imperfections, it would be 
expected that firms would use almost all debt, with the firm 
value maximized by the sure stream of income generated by 
the tax-sheltering effect of the debt. 
This sure stream of income generated by the tax 
deductibility of interest would increase the stream ot 
income to shareholders and thus increase shareholder wealth. 
With no market imperfections, this stream would be 
discounted at the risk-free rate, thus adding the maximum 
value possible to the firm. 
The existence of market imperfections such as 
bankruptcy and agency costs are used to explain the 
generally lower levels of debt observed. Because of the 
risk of bankruptcy, firms tend to use less than the level of 
debt allowed by the market since too much debt could hurt 
the firm in the future. MM (64) noted that excess debt 
could make the firm less flexible. Hong and Rappaport (46) 
felt excess debt made the firm more subject to "financial 
distress". Or, if the firm was unable to pay either interest 
or principal, possible bankruptcy and reorganization could 
occur, with possible loss of value. Baxter (7) and Warner 
(91) have estimated some of these costs of bankruptcy. 
Agency costs include the cost to the firm of protecting 
investors in bonds from actions of management detrimental to 
the wealth of bondholders. As pointed out by Jensen and 
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Meckling (47), the firm is willing to pay these costs, such 
as bonding of employees or the hiring of trustees, in order 
to ensure the lowest possible risk for investors and hence 
the lowest cost to the firm for the debt. In addition to 
these agency costs are the actual costs of issuing 
securities, which have both a fixed component, tied to 
actual registration costs and fees, and a variable 
component, tied to the risk and the size of the security 
issue. These costs, of course, affect the actual interest 
cost of the funds to the firm and reduce the value of debt 
to the firm. These costs are seen as another market 
imperfection that keeps firms from utilizing a higher debt 
ratio. 
While debt has been viewed as mainly having value 
because of the value additivity of this stream of additional 
income, several authors, including Ross (73, 74), Leland and 
Pyle (52), Myers (67), and Williamson (94) have noted that 
debt may have additional uses for management by allowing 
managers to "signal" investors of upcoming, significant 
changes in the firm by changes in the debt ratio. By 
signaling these changes, managers can calm investors' fears 
about rumors or upcoming changes and ensure investors that 
management is not only aware of future problems or 
opportunities but also actively moving to maximize firm 
value under these nsw conditions. 
This signaling concept suggests that the timing of the 
change in debt ratio should be in advance of the actual 
change in the business risk of the firm if the signal is to 
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be of any aid to the investors. In addition, because of the 
time lag involved in issuing debt, if a manager is to 
maximize firm value in the future, it is necessary to make 
adjustments in the debt ratio at the present time in order 
to have the firm at the optimal debt level when the future 
change in business risk occurs. 
This time lag has been noted in empirical studies by 
Ang (3), Spies (82), and Marsh (55) and possibly explains 
why earlier cross-sectional empirical studies of the 
relationship of debt ratios and risk produced generally 
disappointing results. The change in debt and business risk 
does not occur contemporaneously, for firms take some time 
to adjust debt ratios, and, as postulated in this study, it 
is possible that firms changed debt ratios in anticipation 
of future changes in risk. Cross-sectional studies, 
therefore, would at best capture only those firms in 
equilibrium during a particular year and miss all those 
firms in the process of changing debt ratios in anticipation 
of upcoming changes in the firm. The importance of non-
contemporaneous variables in modeling investment and 
f inartcing decisions has been noted by Myers (68) and McCabe 
(5 9) • 
The Theoretical Model 
Purpose of the Model 
The purpose of the model is to provide additional 
support to the importance of financial structure to firms. 
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The model shows why only certain firms are able to make full 
use of debt because they enjoy relatively lower costs of 
debt and greater market freedom. In particular, the model 
will explain the timing of changes in financial structure 
relative to changes in business risk and also the importance 
of these changes. Further, the model will explain why cross-
sectional empirical studies have failed to demonstrate a 
relationship between business risk and debt level. 
Assumptions 
The theoretical model is based on seven assumptions. 
1. Debt has value. 
2. The level of debt is, in part, a trade-off 
between cost of insolvency and value of debt. 
3. A change in the level of debt has information 
value to the market. 
4. Managers attempt to maximize the value of the 
firm because it is in their best interest. 
5. There is an unequal ability between firms to 
use the full tax shield of debt. 
6. The value of debt is dependent on the cost of 
debt. 
7. There is a discrete time necessary to change 
financial structure. 
These assumptions are generally well accepted in the 
literature of finance. The concept that debt has value in a 
world with taxes has been shown from a macroeconomic 
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viewpoint by MM (64) and Modigliani (66). The value of 
leverage on a microeconomic basis, based on the tax shield 
of debt, is presented in most basic textbooks (11). The 
level of debt used by a firm is the result, in part, of a 
trade-off between cost of insolvency and the value of debt, 
as pointed out by Kraus and Litzenberger (51) and Robichek 
and Myers (72). The importance of debt levels and debt level 
changes, at least to investors, is demonstrated by the 
constant coverage of debt ratios by the various investment 
services. Jensen and Meckling (47) have demonstrated the 
mechanism by which managers' compensation packages tend to 
ensure that wealth maximization for managers and 
shareholders are similar. The assumption that firms have 
unequal abilities to use the tax shield of debt is suggested 
by both DeAngelo and Masulis (17) and Cordes and Sheff rin 
(16). Miller (60), Hamada (38), and Marsh (55) have pointed 
out the importance of the cost of funds to the decisions 
regarding debt. 
In the MM study (62), it was assumed that firms could 
make essentially instantaneous changes in their financial 
structure. In actuality, firms require some time to make 
financial structure changes. Ang (3) and Spies (82) have 
discussed the definite intertemporal behavior of changes in 
debt. The time necessary to make changes in financial 
structure is influenced by several factors, including the 
time necesary to make decisions regarding the correct 
direction of debt level change, to gain acceptance within 
the firm, to check for legal and regulatory problems, to 
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engage and negotiate with an investment banker, and to 
fulfill SEC requirements. 
Further, this time necessary to carry out changes in 
financial structure is influenced by the method used to 
change financial structure. If debt is merely paid off using 
internally available funds, the time required to change debt 
level could be quite short. However, if a new issue is used, 
the time necessary could be significantly longer, because of 
the aforementioned regulatory, legal and marketing 
constraints. 
The Model 
From the assumptions presented above, a theoretical 
model is postulated that will address many of the troubling 
questions of financial structure. In the past it has been 
assumed that all firms were "forced" by the market toward an 
optimal debt ratio, in the sense that all firms should show 
optimal debt ratios, given their "respective" situations. 
The firm's respective situation is defined by such factors 
as past earnings, risk, growth opportunities, economic 
outlook, and managerial expertise. While all managers may 
attempt to optimize the value of the firm using financial 
structure changes, firms do not necessarily have an equal 
ability to follow an optimal path because of their 
respective situations. 
In this study, it is postulated that the ability to 
approach this optimal use of debt is limited to firms that 
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enjoy low market rates, that have low issuing, bankruptcy 
and agency costs, that can make full use of the tax shield 
of debt, and that have the managerial expertise and market 
freedom to change financial structure at the optimal time. 
The cost of debt to an individual firm, particularly 
after-tax, depends on many factors. These factors include 
the market rate of debt for the firm, the ability of the 
firm to use the tax shelter provided by the debt, and the 
additional costs of debt. 
These three cost factors affect the actual, after-tax 
cost of debt to the firm. This actual, after-tax cost of 
debt determines the value of debt to the firm. Thus, the 
concept of lower cost debt implies the ability to garner the 
full savings on debt resulting from the tax deductibility of 
interest, to enjoy minimal issuing and agency costs, and to 
issue at the lowest possible rates. As pointed out by Miller 
(60), if the cost of debt is above some point, debt no 
longer adds value to the firm. 
Not all firms can issue debt at the lowest possible 
cost. The bond rating of the firm determinest in part, the 
market cost of debt to the firm. Stronger firms can 
obviously issue debt at lower market rates. In addition, 
larger firms have an advantage because of economies of scale 
· in terms of issuing and agency costs. These issuing and 
agency costs have both fixed and v~riable components. For 
larger firms, involved with large issues, the fixed part of 
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the cost adds only slightly to the total cost and even the 
variable costs may decrease significantly for larger issues. 
Further, many of these issuing and agency costs are not 
marginal costs for larger firms, but costs incurred whether 
or not the firm issues securities. 
Assume for a particular risk class of firms, possibly 
categorized by bond rating agencies, that the market rates 
for long-term debt instruments range between some level "X" 
and "Y" with X < Y. The mean of X and Y and the range 
between X and Y over time changes dependent on market 
conditions. Further assume, as suggested by Miller, that 
there is some market rate "Qi" below which debt is of value 
to firm "i". The market rate to firm "i" is "Mi"• The rate 
below which debt is value to the firm, Qi, could be within 
three different ranges. If Qi < x, then debt is not of 
value to the firm. If Q· 1 is between x and Y, then de bl: 
will be of value to the firm if Qi is less than Mi. If 
Qi is above Y, then debt will always be of value to the 
firm. 
This market rate M· 1 is not the only rate ot 
importance to the firm. The firm is also interested in the 
after-tax cost of debt, "Ci"· This after-tax cost of debt is 
determined, in part, by the ability of the firm to use the 
tax shield fully. This would mean that the firm can fully 
utilize both the tax savings generated by the interest 
payments and the possible additional tax-savings generated 
by the new investment depreciation allowances and tax 
credits if the funds are used for new investment. If C· l. 
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< 
Qi, then the firm will add value to the firm by issuing 
debt. 
If the firm is unable to fully utilize all the tax 
advantages of the debt, then the effective after-tax rate to 
the firm would be higher, possibly moving C· l. above Qi • 
Thus, even with a low market rate Mi, it is possible that, 
because of the inability to utilize the full benefits of the 
tax shelter, a firm would not add value by issuing debt 
since C· l. would be greater than Qi. 
This adjustment of Mi to Ci, as a result of the 
ability to use the tax shelter of debt, can be further 
developed to include other costs to firms, such as 
bankruptcy, issuing and agency costs. These costs vary for 
each firm.and affect the value of Ci. In all cases, these 
additional costs will increase C· l. to some level "A . II l. • 
Again, if Ai is greater than Qi , then additional debt 
will not add value to the firm. A firm could have a low 
market rate, Mi , and be fully able to utilize the tax 
shelter of the debt so that C· l. is lower that Qi • But if 
the issuing, bankruptcy and agency costs are too great, then 
Ai will be greater than Qi , and debt will not add market 
value to the firm. This does not mean firms will not issue 
new debt. Firms may issue debt if there are potential 
control problems and funds are needed, for example, to 
remain competitive, or to meet government pollution 
standards. This is of course a sub-optimal path, but 
possibly the only path open to management at the time. 
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Whether debt is of value to a firm is dependent, then, 
upon market rates, the ability to use the tax shield, and 
the size of various other costs associated with issuing 
debt. Certain firms would have a greater probability of 
having debt add value. These firms would be firms that enjoy 
the lowest possible rates in the market, have the ability to 
fully utilize the tax shelter of the debt, and enjoy low 
issuing, bankruptcy and agency costs. 
"These firms would of necessity have to be the larger 
firms, with strong histories of earnings, and strong future 
potential of earnings. Having larger firms ensures that 
there is a high probability that earnings would be taxed at 
the maximum rate and that earnings would remain strong in 
the future so that tax shelter will continue to be of value. 
The firms would also have to be large in order to enjoy 
economies of scale in their agency and issuing costs. 
Larger, successful firms would have low bankruptcy 
costs, however measured. These firms would have a small 
probability of earnings falling below some level where 
actual bankruptcy and reorganization would occur or where 
even financial distress would occur. 
The strong history of earnings and strong future 
potential would ensure lower market rates and increase the 
probability that the firm could utilize the full benefit of 
the tax shelter. Thus, larger, more successful firms have a 
higher probability of A· 1 being less than Qi 
debt having value to the firm. 
. and thus 
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Managerial Expertise and Market Freedom 
Market freedom and managerial expertise imply that 
firms do in fact have a choice about raising funds and 
changing financial structure and are willing and able to 
make this choice. Firms with stronger financial histories 
have greater freedom in the marketplace and are less 
restricted by prior convenents on debt issue. Many firms, 
because of past financial problems, are restricted in what 
types of securities they can issue and in what volume. Firms 
with poorer financial histories or control problems may be 
constrained from issuing the optimal security because of 
fears of loss of voting control or restrictive covenents. 
Larger, more successful firms can also hire, either 
permanently or short-term, additional expertise and staff to 
properly address the many facets of running the corporation. 
This ability should increase the quality and timeliness of 
decisionmaking. 
Further, large firms with strong financial record are 
less affected in future decisions by present decisions. That 
is, the potential opportunity costs of present financial 
structure decisions are low, further increasing the 
flexibility and market freedom of managers. 
Timing Q.f Financial Structure Changes 
The timing of changes in financial structure is 
dependent upon several factors, including the asymmetrical 
distribution of information between managers and investors, 
107 
the need for managers to adjust the financial structure as 
business risk changes to ensure firm value maximization, the 
actual time constraints on changing financial structure, and 
the information content of financial structure changes. 
The ~metrical Distribution 
Q.f Information 
Myers' model (67) of the firm suggests that the firm's 
value is the summation of the value of two "bundles" of 
assets: the assets in place and the options the firm holds 
on future projects. Over time, the value of each one of 
these bundles can change as future sales for the present 
output of the assets in place change and as the relative 
value of the options (i.e., future projects) that the firm 
holds changes. Thus, even though the future sales of the 
present products of the firm may remain constant, the future 
business risk of the firm may change as the value of the 
options held by the firm changes. This information anout 
future projects is known, at best, only in general to the 
market. As a result of this superior information about the 
options of the firm and the assets in place, the manager of 
the firm is best able to estimate the value of the firm. 
The value of the firm, using Myers' model is: 
v = ~ + of Cl} 
where AP = value of assets in place 
Of = value of future projects the firm has options on. 
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The information that the market has about the firm is 
made up two subsets: information known to the market about 
the assets in place and information known to the market 
about the future options of the firm. The information known 
by the market about the assets in place will generally be 
less than the information known by the firm. However, the 
information known to the mar.ket about the options of the 
firm will be much less than the infomation known by the 
firm. 
The information about the firm's assets in place can be 
defined as 
1pa = 1am + 1af + 1au (2) 
where lpa =total information about assets in place if no 
uncertainty existed 
lam = information about assets in place known to the 
market (and the firm} 
laf = information about assets in place known only to 
the firm 
lau = information that is unknowable because of 
uncertainty. 
As noted above, in most cases, the management of the firm 
will have information superior to the information known to 
the participants within the markets. Consequently, the 
management of the firm is in a superior position to the 
participants in the financial markets in estimating the 
value of the assets in place. But the amount of information 
known by the management is not much greater than the amount 
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of information known by market participants. This slight 
difference results because a great deal of background 
information is available if a product has been on the market 
for any length of time. In addition, information from 
competitors, suppliers, marketing surveys and other non-firm 
sources can be used to estimate future sales and future risk 
of the existing product. 
However, the second subset of information about the 
firm's options on future projects has a different 
distribution between the firm and the market. The second 
subset of information can be divided in the same fashion as 
the information about the assets in place. However, 
financial markets have little information regarding the 
value of the future options of the firm. Because competition 
causes secrecy about future projects, firms cannot give the 
financial markets much specific information about future 
projects. The total information about future projects on 
which the firm has options can be defined as: 
(3} 
where I 0 p = information about future projects assuming 
perfect certainty 
I 0 m = information about future projects known to 
financial markets and the firm 
I 0 f = information about future projects known only to 
the firm 
I 0 u = information about future projects that is 
unknowable because of uncertainty. 
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As in the case of the assets in place, the firm knows 
more information than the market, but the difference in 
information known only by the firm and that known by the 
market is far greater than for the assets in place. The 
information known only to the firm may in fact include the 
existence and feasibility of projects completely unknown to 
the markets. This would be particularly true in larger firms 
with many diversified divisions, where research and 
development endeavors are wide-ranging and where the firm 
has numerous channels available to develop new ideas. 
Changes in Financial Structure 
As new information becomes available to the firm, the 
future prospects of the assets in place and the options on 
future projects change. Thus, as new information is gained, 
the business risk of the firm and the estimated future 
business risk of the firm change. At any given point in 
time, the firm generally enjoys a slight advantage in 
information over the market regarding the assets in place 
and a large advantage in information regarding future 
projects on which the firm holds options. But this "firm" 
information, which affects both the business risk and the 
estimated future business risk of the firm, will become 
known, at least in part, to the market. 
Because part or all of this information will become 
known to the market, the management of the firm must adjust 
the financial structure of the firm to maximize the value of 
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the firm, given the new level of business risk. This flow of 
information from that known only to the firm to that known 
by the financial markets is continuous, although not 
necessarily regular. Firms realize this and also realize 
that once this new information is known to the market, the 
value of the firm will change. 
Time Lags in Changing the 
Financial Structure 
Changes in the level of debt of the firm cannot be made 
instantaneously. There is a time lag between the perception 
of the non-optimal debt level and the necessary change. This 
time lag is influenced by such factors as the amount of time 
to make the decisions, to gain acceptance of the changes 
within the firm, to check for legal and regulatory problems, 
to engage and negotiate with an investment banker, and to 
fulfill SEC requirements. This lag in changing the financial 
structure can be greater than one year or at least not be 
recorded on annual data for a year or more. Since the data 
available were yearly data, the time periods in this study 
are considered to be one year. 
The time necessary to make changes in the financial 
structure is also influenced by the method used to change 
the financial structure. If the financial structure is 
changed by selling new stocks or bonds, the time necessary 
to make the change will be longer because of regulatory, 
legal and marketing constraints. If debt or stock is 
repurchased, there will be some length of time necessary to. 
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carry out the repurchase. If debt is paid off using 
available cash, the time necessary could be quite slight. In 
any case, management must allow some time for the change in 
financial structure. 
Because of the constantly changing nature of business 
risk, managers face a difficult problem in making 
adjustments in financial leverage. Assume that management 
makes a change in the financial structure of the firm at a 
point in time "x" in order to maximize the value of the 
firm, given the business risk of the firm at time "x". By 
the time the change in the debt level is completed, the 
business risk of the firm could have again changed, so, by 
the time the new financial structure is implemented, the 
financial structure could be optimal only for the business 
risk of the firm in a prior period. Consequently, management 
would end up chasing an optimal debt ratio. 
Rather than doing this, management begins the process 
of changing its financial leverage at time "x", attempting 
to move to a financial structure that will maximize the 
value of the firm in the future, based on an estimated 1 evel 
of business risk in the future. Managers must make 
decisions, at time "x", about the level of debt that will 
maximize the value of the firm in the future, at time "x + 
f", given the future business risk at time "x + f", because 
of the time required to change debt levels. The time period 
"f" is dependent on the process used to adjust the debt 
level, the condition of the financial markets at that time, 
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and the speed with which the firm can make and implement a 
decision. 
Information Content of Financial 
Structure Changes 
There is an additional reason that management may 
change debt levels prior to anticipated changes in business 
risk. Ross (73,74) and Leland and Pyle (52) suggest that 
management may be using the change in debt 1 evel to 
"signal" some information to investors and the market about 
the anticipated situation of the firm. While the market uses 
all publicly available information in estimating the future 
value of the firm, "insider" information cannot be released 
because of the risk of alerting competitors. 
Management can, however, "signal" something about the 
firm's future by announcing financing plans and starting to 
carry them out. Managers give "honest" signals because to do 
so is in their best interests. If managers attempt to 
"signal" dishonestly (i.e., issue a security to mislead the 
market), the cost to them is quite high, for their wealth is 
tied to the weal th of the firm through stock options, 
bonuses, and other agency costs that will affect their 
compensation. In addition, if they signal dishonestly, they 
will lose credibility with the market and therefore limit 
their ability to use the market to signal in the future. 
Summary Qf the Model 
Given the time lag involved in changing the financial 
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structure, it is necessary that firms change their financial 
structure prior to changes in the firm's business risk. 
This is necessary both so that investors know that 
management is aware of upcoming changes and so that the 
change in financial structure optimizes firm value given the 
new level of business risk for the firm. 
Because managers enjoy an advantage, although not a 
certain monopoly, on the information about the future of 
the firm, managers can both alert investors to upcoming 
changes in the firm and ensure that firm value is maximized 
in the future by making changes in financial structure prior 
to changes in the business risk of the firm. The actions of 
managers in changing the financial structure is a believable 
signal because it is a costly signal to managers if wrong, 
since compensation packages for managers generally include 
stock options or bonuses tied to firm value. 
Only certain firms can approach the full utilization of 
debt that microeconomic theory would suggest. This is not to 
suggest that stronger firms issue more debt or have higher 
debt ratios. As shown by Kim (48) and Turnbull (90), the 
debt capacity of the firm, as allowed by the market, is 
greater than the optimal debt ratio. Thus, firms will not 
move to a maximum debt ratio as allowed by the market, but 
. 
rather an optimal debt ratio that maximizes market value. 
Firms which can enjoy the lowest possible costs, or at least 
costs below where debt will add value to the firm, and have 
the choice and ability to make optimal financial decisions 
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will be best able to move toward an optimal debt level. 
Other firms may be forced to issue non-optimal securities 
because of past restrictions, lack of market freedom, or 
control problems. In addition, some firms may not be able to 
change their financial structures toward a more optimal debt 
level because of internal or market conditions. 
Hence, only a small subset of the total number of firms 
c.an use debt to its fullest to maximize value. This does 
not mean that only certain firms will have high debt ratios. 
Rather, this means that only some firms will have the market 
freedom and low cost of new securities that will allow the 
firms to move constantly toward an optimal debt ratio 
relative to the business risk of the firm. These stronger 
firms will have the ability to adjust their financial 
structures prior to changes in business risk, allowing them 
to signal investors and ensure that when the change in 
business risk does occur, the firm is already at or moving 
toward an optimal debt level. 
Implications of the Model 
The implications of the above model are fairly wide-
ranging. First, the model implies a two-tiered grouping of 
firms, with only upper-tier firms able to use .debt as 
microeconomic theory would suggest (i.e., Ai < Qi). These 
firms would have a cost of debt that is below the cost where 
debt no longer adds value to the firm. This lower cost 
would result from the lower market rates enjoyed by these 
firms, from their lower agency, bankruptcy and issuing 
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costs, and from their ability to make full use of the tax 
shelter provided by debt. The firms in the upper tier are 
able to change financial structure prior to changes in 
business risk, ensuring that when the future change in 
business risk occurs, the firm has already moved toward 
optimizing firm value by making adjustments in financial 
structure. Further, the firms in the upper tier, by changing 
financial structure prior to changes in business risk, 
reduce uncertainty in the market and increase confidence 
that the firm has a good understanding of the future of the 
firm. 
Firms in the lower tier have a lesser ability to use 
debt in the best possible manner, but still may show changes 
in financial structure. These firms still have needs for 
funding of new projects, but may be forced to postpone 
projects until markets for funds are more favorable or to 
use sub-optimal financing plans. 
These lower tier firms may be unable to issue debt at a 
cost below the cost where debt increases value. This higher 
cost may be due to a weak financial history or weak 
potential future earnings. These firms may be unable to 
fully use the tax shelter provided by the debt. Or, the 
firms in these lower tiers may be smaller firms which makes 
their effective interest rate, after agency and issuing 
costs, too high to be of advantage to the firm, in terms of 
maximizing market value. 
The firms in the lower tier may have prior restrictions 
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on borrowing or may have control problems that preclude 
issuing the optimal security at a particular time. This 
inability to use financial structure consistently to improve 
firm value means that many of the firms in the market are 
not at an optimal financial structure. Firms with the 
inability to use debt effectively are essentially forced 
either to try constantly to adjust financial structure after 
business risk has changed or to accept constant sub-optimal 
decisions, either using too expensive debt or waiting until 
funds become available from internal sources or equity. 
Equity, however, may be a risky option if there are possible 
control problems or takeover possibilities. 
Thus, firms in the lower tier still issue securities, 
but because of the particular situation of the firm, it is 
impossible for the firm to follow an optimal path in regard 
to financial structure. Firms in the lower tier must follow 
a sub-optimal path, since the firm's particular situation 
effectively closes off the optimal path. These firms are 
unable to issue securities at a cost that maximizes the 
value of the firm or to issue at a time that will ensure the 
proper financial structure when the condition of the firm 
changes. 
If this two-tiered grouping of firms, in terms of 
ability to use debt, actually exists, then it explains, in 
part, why cross-sectional empirical studies have been 
generally disappointing. The firms in the upper tier, able 
to take full advantage of debt as microeconomic theory would 
suggest, adjust financial structure prior to changes in 
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business risk. Thus, any cross-sectional studies would miss 
the relationship of' business risk and financial structure. 
Firms in the lower tier would adjust financial structure 
after business risk had changed, and possibly adjust their 
financial structure in a non-optimal way, because of the 
restrictions or costs peculiar to that firm. Again, cross-
sectional empirical studies would not be able to isolate the 
relationship between business risk and financial structure. 
This model also provides a possible explanation of the 
conflict between macroeconomic and microeconomic theories of 
the value of debt. Debt may not have positive value to all 
firms in the entire market, but this does not preclude debt 
having value to some firms. The value of debt is tied to the 
actual cost to the firm. If a firm is able to keep its real 
cost below some point, then debt will have value to the firm 
( 60). While numerous studies, as ref er red to by Modigliani 
(66), have suggested that clientele effects have some 
importance in explaining debt policies of firms, most ot 
these arguments assume that, on average, individuals can 
borrow at a rate close to the rate enjoyed by the firm, thus 
making "homemade" leverage more attra~tive. However, these 
first tier firms can borrow at actual rates below the rates 
available to investors. In addition, since debt ratios for 
large firms do not vary significantly over time because of 
the size of these firms, any changes in financial structure 
will not involve a significant change in clientele. 
This model also helps explain why empirical studies, 
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whether using cross-sectional methods or a time series 
method, have been unable to isolate a relationship between 
business risk and financial structure. If there is a varying 
ability among firms to use debt effectively, then a sample 
picked according to criteria other than strong, consistent 
earnings will be a sample of firms that have widely varying 
actual costs of debt (Ai) and a great difference in the 
timing of changes in financial structure between firms. With 
a sample that does not discriminate between firms with 
varying costs of debt and market flexibility, even a time 
series model will not identify ~ny consistent relationship 
between financial structure and business risk. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Purpose of the Empirical Model 
The empirical model of this study is designed to test 
the theoretical model postulated in Chapter Three. This 
theoretical model postulates that firms tend to change 
financial structure prior to changes in business risk when 
firms have the ability to maximize value. Firms are able to 
maximize value when the cost of raising funds for the firm 
is low and the firms have the market freedom and managerial 
expertise to carry out optimal funding and financial 
structure changes. 
This low cost implies that the firms enjoy lower market 
rates, lower bankruptcy, agency and issuing costs, and are 
able to make maximum use of the tax shelter available 
through the use of debt. Market freedom results from strong 
past performances and expected strong future earnings. 
Managerial expertise implies firms are able to hire the best 
managers and provide them with sufficient incentive to 





Changes in the debt level of the firm are 
strongly correlated with changes in business 
risk. 
Hypothesis II 
Changes in the debt level of the firm occur 
prior to changes in business risk. 
The first hypothesis is concerned with whether there is 
a relationship between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. To test this hypothesis, a correlation model 
was used to ascertain whether there is a relationship 
between changes in debt and changes in business risk. The 
second hypothesis is concerned with whether the relationship 
between changes in debt and changes in business risk is 
leading or lagging. To test the second hypothesis, the 
timing of the significant relationships was analyzed. 
Assumptions 
In developing an empirical model to test relationships 
over time between changes in debt and changes in business 
risk, several assumptions are necessary. First, it is 
assumed that there is some time delay in carrying out a 
change in debt level. Second, it is assumed that the amount 
of time necessary to effect this change is not constant 
within any firm or any industry. This time to adjust debt 
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levels, defined in Chapter 3 as "f ", is dependent on such 
factors as the state of the economy, the method used to 
effect the change in debt level, and the particular 
situation of the firm at the time of the change. Third, it 
is assumed that management consistently attempts to 
maximize the value of the firm, using. as possible, changes 
in debt level. 
Overall Vieli of the Model 
The empirical model tests for significant correlations 
between changes in business risk and changes in debt level 
across time periods. It is hypothesized that there is a 
leading relationship between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. This type of relationship would suggest that 
managers use their information to estimate the future 
business risk of the firm and begin to adjust the debt 
level to maximize firm value, based on the estimated future 
business risk. 
The model tested six different relationships between 
changes in business risk and changes in debt level. Because 
the data available were annual data, the time period (t) is 
defined as one year, so that (t-3) refers to a point in time 
three years prior to (t). The six relationships are 
identified by the relationship of the change in debt 
relative to the change in business risk. 
-3 Changes in Debt (t-3) with Changes in Risk (t) 
-2 Changes in Debt (t-2) with Changes in Risk (t) 
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-1 Changes in Debt (t-1) with Changes in Risk (t) 
+l Changes in Debt (t+l) with Changes in Risk (t) 
+2 Changes in Debt (t+2) with Changes in Risk (t) 
+3 Changes in Debt (t+3) with Changes in Risk (t) 
The figure in parentheses indicating the relative 
timing of the change and the number in front of the 
description is used in the tables to identify the different 
relationships. 
The six relationships were used in testing the two 
hypotheses by first, testing for the total number of 
relationships for Hypothesis I, and second, testing for the 
distribution of relationships for HYpothesis II. 
The Sample 
The data used in the empirical tests are annual data 
from Compustat for the twenty years from 1959 to 1978. The 
firms in the sample are predominantly from the manufacturing 
sector and are listed by name and industry in Appendix A. 
The firms were screened in several ways. First, all firms 
have mostly "pure" debt and "pure" equity. Pure debt is 
defined in a manner similiar to the method used by Ang (3). 
Pure debt is debt that is not convertible or "quasi-debt," 
such as 1 ea sing. Pu r e eq u i t y means that on 1 y one c 1 ass of 
common stock has been issued. 
These def ini ti on avoid problems of classification of 
hybrid and convertible issues. As a result of the large 
offerings of convertible bonds in the late sixties and early 
seventies, it was necessary to allow some firms with "non-
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pure" financing into the sample, in order to develop a 
statistically satisfactory sample size. All of the firms in 
the sample have at least seventy-five percent of their non-
equity sources of funds resulting from pure debt in at least 
seventeen out of the twenty years. 
The second screening required all firms to be large. 
All firms in the sample are listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Standard and Poor's 400 Industrial Index. 
This requirement ensured that the firms had access to major 
financial markets and, because of their size, had low 
agency and issuing costs relative to their total costs. 
The final screening required that all firms show a 
consistent profitability during the twenty years used in the 
study. This profitability requirement ensures that the firms 
in the sample have consistently positive cashflow, and 
hence, a low probability of bankruptcy. This low probability 
of bankruptcy ensured lower market costs for securities, and 
further, the consistent profitability increased the 
probability that the firms in the sample could always use 
the full benefit of the tax shelter of debt. 
This sample used to test the hypotheses is critical to 
the empirical model. It is hypothesized that managers 
estimate the future business risk of the firm and, acting on 
this information, change the debt level of the firm to 
maximize value. This hypothesis assumes that, generally, 
managers of firms in the sample are correct in their 
estimates of future business risk, are able to correctly 
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decide the debt levels that maximize value, and are able to 
implement their decision. Miller and Modigliani (62) 
assumed that the market forces all firms to adjust to an 
optimal debt level. While there are no studies that have 
investigated possible debt optimization differences between 
firms, it is assumed that firms that consistently generate 
positive cashflows are better able to optimize the value of 
the firm by using debt since these firms will have a higher 
probability of producing the minimum cashflows necessary to 
service the debt. Because of the lower risk ot default, 
these firms have the widest range of debt levels open to 
them. Further, it is assumed that firms that consistently 
generate positive cashflows are, in part, generating these 
consistent, positive cashflows because management in these 
firms is better able to estimate the future. These firms are 
able to attract the better management because of their 
higher and more consistent profitability. No specific 
studies have shown that.firms with consistently positive 
cashflows hire management that is better able to predict 
future business risk, but such a relationship appears 
reasonable. 
As a result of these two assumptions, a sample was 
selected that minimized the probability of bankruptcy and 
maximized the probability of having superior management 
since it was felt that firms that had shown consistent 
profitability had a lower probability of bankruptcy and 
could attract better managers. While it is not assumed that 
managers of the firms in the sample always made correct 
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estimates of business risk and always made the optimal debt 
level decision, it is assumed that managers of the firms 
in the sample are most likely to make good estimates of 
future business risk, to make good decisions regarding 
optimal debt levels, and to have available the maximum range 
of debt level options. 
As noted above, the firms in the sample were drawn from 
the manufacturing sector, and.while they differ greatly in 
size and industry, all were consistently profitable, debt-
using firms. While individual firms showed great variation 
in their debt levels over the twenty years studied, in terms 
of overall average debt level, the sample was relatively 
homogeneous. During the years 195 9 to 197 8 the majority of 
the firms (89%) had between 24% and 50% of their total book 
value financed by debt (book value). The use of long term 
debt had a somewhat larger spread, with between 3% and 42% 
of their total value financed by long term debt. However, 
the majority of the firms (83%) had between 9% and 27% of 
their total value financed by long term debt. The variation 
in debt level over time, measured either in terms of total 
debt to total assets or long term debt to total assets, 
varied greatly for the individual firms. These findings 
support Spies' hypothesis that temporary financing is orten 
utilized for both dividends and investments. 
These relatively small ranges of average debt usage and 
large variations in individual debt levels suggest that the 
relevant question in investigating debt policy is concerned 
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with the debt level change response of firms to changes in 
business risk rather than the relationship of their absolute 
debt level to some measure of their absolute business risk. 
While earlier studies (62) (76) have focused on the massive 
differences in absolute debt levels between industries 
(especially between utilities and other industries), in the 
manufacturing sector there appears to be little difference 
in debt policy in terms of absolute debt levels. As noted by 
Wippern (95), the major differences in debt levels shown in 
earlier studies was due to the massive differences between 
utilites and other industries. The sample in this study 
reinforces this view, showing little difference in absolute 
debt levels between firms or industries. 
From the results of these earlier studies and the 
evidence from the sample, the measure of importance is the 
change in debt level rather than the absolute debt level, 
since the absolute debt levels seem to be so similar. If the 
managers of the firm are constantly attempting to maximize 
value, then the only t~me they would change debt level is 
when there is a chance to further optimize the value of the 
firm. Since the firm is already at, or moving toward, an 
optimal financial structure for the given conditions, the 
only reason to change debt levels would be if the condi t.ions 
for the firm change. 
The Empirical Model 
The ~ of Changes .in Debt and 
Changes _in Risk 
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The empirical model concentrates on changes in debt and 
changes in business risk rather than absolute values because 
it is assumed that management attempts to maximize value of 
the firm at all times. The debt level that maximizes value 
is dependent on conditions in the company and the 
environment at that time period. Thus, the optimal debt 
level or ratio for a firm could vary from year to year. This 
assumption means that management uses all the information 
available to optimize the debt level of the firm. Hence, the 
only time management will change the debt level occurs when 
new information re-defines that optimal debt level. This 
means that the driving force for change is new information. 
Only when this new information affects the optimal debt 
level for the firm will there be a change in the debt level. 
The driving force is change and, hence, the model must 
define the relationship between debt and business risk by 
evaluating the relationship between changes in debt and 
changes in business risk. 
The Reasons for a Time Series Model 
The empirical model is designed to allow investigation 
of the relationship of changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. It has been assumed that changes in debt 
level require some time "f", which is not necessarily 
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constant either between or within firms. This time required 
between the perception of the need to adjust the debt level 
and the actual recording of the change in debt level on the 
firm's balance sheet could extend over more than one period. 
This lag in the recording of changes in debt levels is 
in part the result of the utilization of yearly data and in 
part the result of the non-constant time "f" required to 
actually carry out the change. As an example of this 
problem, assume that a firm, using a calendar accounting 
year, decides to change the optimal debt level (debt/total 
assets) of the firm in September, 19Xl, by selling a new 
issue of debt. By the time the debt issue is actually 
recorded on the year end balance sheet, possibly fifteen 
months have passed, since it would be very difficult to 
carry out a new issue in time to record the issue on the 
balance sheet for 19Xl. However, if the same change in debt 
level was made by buying back stock from one large investor 
using available cash, it is possible that the change in the 
debt level could have been recorded in 19Xl rather than 
19X2. In both cases, the debt level would have changed in 
the same direction, but the time of recording would be one 
period different. 
It is apparent that these two different methods to 
affect a change in the debt level (measured by debt/total 
assets) would have differing effects on the overall 
riskiness of the firm. The major point, however, is that 
changing the debt level of the firm can be accomplished in a 
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number of ways, and the time necessary to effect this change 
depends in part on the method used. Because the model is 
attempting to relate changes in debt and changes in risk, 
and these changes in debt may be recorded in periods 
different from the decision to change the debt level, a time 
series model is necessary. Further, since it is hypothesized 
that there is a leading relationship between changes in debt 
and changes in business risk, a time series model is 
necessary. 
Development of the Business Risk Measure 
The risk measure is designed to measure changes in 
business risk while allowing for two adjustments to 
normalize the raw measure of business risk change. These 
adjustments are necessary because the management of a firm 
does not merely look at the raw change in the business risk, 
but must also make allowances for the overall changes in the 
economy and for what is a "normal" change within the 
company. This normal change is what past experience would 
indicate is a reasonable change in the operating income of 
the company. Any firm shows some variation in its earning 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) over time. This variation, 
usually measured by standard deviation, gives the management 
a range within which variations can be judged as normal or 
otherwise. Hence, the actual raw measure of the change in 
business risk must first be adjusted for the normal changes 
expected in business risk for the firm. 
The measure must also be adjusted for the changes in 
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the economy as managers and the market judge the firm in 
relation to the rest of the market. In this study, the 
change in the market is measured by a "proxy", the 
performance of the other firms in the sample. 
The raw measure of business risk change is the yearly 
change in earnings before interest and taxes. This measure 
was used for several reasons. First, EBIT is a tr a di ti on al 
measure of business risk. Second, the change in EB IT 
captures both changes in sales and changes in operating 
leverage. Finally, the use of changes in EBIT as a measure 
of business risk has been empirically tested and found to 
be a very strong indicator of business risk by Zumwalt and 
Shin (96). 
The change in EBIT risk was first adjusted for the 
normal business risk change expected in the firm. The raw 
measure of change in business risk, change in EBIT, was 
adjusted using the standard deviation of the EBIT for the 
firm over the period. After the first adjustment, the risk 
measure becomes 
(1) 
where RMt, i = risk measure for time period t for firm i 
S.D.i = standard deviation of EBIT for firm i over the 
twenty year period. 
The resulting risk measure relates the amount of 
change in EBIT from one year to the next relative to a 
measure of "normal" change in the EBIT or the firm. This 
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adjustment is made by using one standard deviation as a 
measure of the "normal" change experienced by the firm. In 
addition, since there is wide variation in total asset size 
between firms, this use of the standard deviation of EBIT 
scales the changes in EBIT for the relative sizes of the 
EBIT of different size firms. 
This change in EBIT must also be evaluated in terms of 
the rest of the economy. If all firms are showing a great 
increase in EBIT, then a larger than normal change for the 
firm may not signify any real change in the business risk of 
the firm. The second adjustment is to adjust for the 
changes in the economy and essentially "de-trend" results 
over the twenty year period. A ranking and differencing 
procedure is used. The change in EBIT, relative to the 
standard deviation, is ranked for each firm relative to all 
firms in the sample for each year. Hence, for each year 
there is a number assigned to each firm, based on the firm's 
change in EBIT, relative to its standard deviation of EBIT. 
The change in this number from one year to the next is the 
relative business risk change of the firm. The larger the 
change in EB IT, relative to the standard dev ia ti on of EB IT 
for the firm and relative to the changes in firms in the 
sample, the larger the relative change in business risk. 
A diagram of the development of the business risk 
measure is shown in Figure 1. There are four steps to the 
process. First, the change in EBIT is developed by 
differencing the EBIT of each year. Second, the change in 
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firm. Third, the resultant measure is ranked with all other 
firms in the sample. Finally, the change in rank order is 
found for each firm. The series, composed of the changes in 
rank order, represents the measure of change in business 
risk for the firm, over the twenty years of the sample. 
These last two procedures of ranking and differencing 
the rank orders de-trend the data by ensuring that the firm 
registers a change in business risk only if the level of 
EBIT changes relative to the normal changes expected for the 
firm, and relative to the changes in all firms in the 
sample. Hence, a firm can show a change in business risk 
only if the change in EBIT is large relative to the standard 
deviation of the EBIT of the firm over the twenty year 
period and this change is large relative to the changes in 
the EBIT of other firms. If all firms are showing a gain {or 
loss) in EBIT, then the ranking of any one firm which shows 
a similar change in EBIT will not change. A change in EBIT, 
even if it is large relative to the standard deviation of 
EBIT for the firm, may not be large enough to register as a 
change in business risk. If all other firms are also 
experiencing a large increase in EBIT {as in an upswing in 
the economy), then the change in the individual firm's EBIT 
will not result in a change in business risk measure. 
This numerical rank ordering of the firms in each year, 
dependent upon the ratio of the change in EB IT to the 
standard deviation of EBIT of the firm, has been tested by 
Zumwalt and Shin {96). They found that when rank ordered 
135 
business risk variables were used, all of the eight 
variables tested were significant in ANOVA tests of industry 
financial structure. When the raw variables were tested, 
only three of the eight variables were significant. 
This measure of business risk was not designed to 
measure exactly the business risk of a firm at a particular 
time. Rather, this measure is designed to indicate changes 
in business risk for the firm, relative to the cnanges in 
business risk that the firm would generally expect and 
relative to the changes in other firms in the economy. 
The purpose of this risk measure is to integrate two 
sets of information used by the management to assess the 
business risk of the firm. The management uses the 
(estimated) performance of the firm and this performance 
relative to other firms to judge the business risk of the 
firm. As mentioned before, the performance of other firms in 
the sample is used as a "proxy" to measure change in the 
overall economy. 
Development of the Debt Measure 
Two separate sets of correlations were run as two 
different variables are used to measure the change in debt 
level. The debt level was measured first using total debt as 
a percentage of total assets and then long ~erm debt as a 
percentage of total assets. Both of these measures were 
found to be significant indicators of differences in 
financial structure between industries by Zumwalt and Shin 
(96). Zumwalt and Shin tested the variables used by numerous 
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earlier studies and their own study, using an ANOVA 
procedure to test for differences between industries. They 
found that total debt to total assets, as used by Ferri and 
Jones (32) and Remmers et al. (71), and long-term debt to 
total assets, used in their own study, were consistently 
significant variables. 
The change in debt level percentage (debt as a 
percentage of total assets) for each firm was used to 
measure the change in debt. Two different measures of debt 
level were used, total debt to total assets and long term 
debt to total assets, because, as noted by Spies (82) firms 
often use temporary financing during their adjustment of 
financial structure. The resultant two series of debt level 
measures had nineteen changes in debt for each firm for the 
twenty years studied. 
Correlation Method 
The two measures for each firm, the measure of cnange 
in risk and the measure of change in debt, were correlated 
using a Pearson product-moment correlation. Two sets of six 
different correlations were calculated for each company in 
the sample, using the appropriate leads and lags described 
in the section on the Overall View of the Model. The two 
different sets of correlations used two different measures 
of debt, changes in long term debt to total assets and 
changes in total debt to total assets. These two debt series 
were individually correlated with the series representing 
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the changes in business risk. 
For the first hypothesis, the null hypothesis was that 
there was no correlation between changes in debt level and 
changes in business risk. For the second hypothesis the 
testing was involved with the timing of the significant 
relationships. The null hypothesis was that there was no 
predominant lead or lag relationship between changes in debt 
and changes in business risk. 
For testing the correlation between change in debt and 
change in business risk an alpha of 0.10 was selected. 
Fisher's approximation was used to to determine the critical 
values for r, the correlation coefficient. Fisher's 
approximation calculates the critical value of r for a given 
alpha. The approximation is 
z = ( (n-3) .5/2) (ln (l+r)/(1-r) ln (l+p)/(1-p)) (2) 
where r = the correlation coefficient for the sample 
n = the sample size 
and p = the correlation coefficient for the population. 
In this case, since the null hypothesis is that p = O, the 
terms involving p drop out. The formula, for n = 19, becomes 
Z=2ln ((l+r)/(1-r)) (3) 
or r = (eZ/2_ 1) I (eZ/2 - 1) (4) 
For a alpha of 0.10, which implies z = 1.645, the critical 
value is r = +0.39. 
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Raw Results of Empirical Testing 
The raw results of the empirical testing are presented 
in Appendix B. These results are summarized in the following 
tables. 
Table I shows that for the one hundred fifty-three 
firms in the sample, approximately half of those firms 
showed a significant relationship between changes in debt 
and changes in business risk. The correlation between 
changes in long term debt and changes in business risk was 
significant for 85 firms, or 56% of the sample. The 
correlati~n between changes in total debt and changes in 
business risk was significant for 81 firms, or 53% of the 
sample. Of the firms that showed significant correlations, 
there was a great deal of commonality, with 54 firms, or 
approximately two-thirds of the firms with significant 
correlations being identified in the correlations using 
long-term debt to total assets and total debt to total 
assets. In using both measures of change in debt, a total of 
109 firms, or 71% of the sample, were found to have 
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The six different relationships ref erred to are as 
listed earlier. The meaning of these relationships ii:) 
explained in Figure 2. In Figure 2 the change in debt 
measures are numbered from 1 to 4 as are the changes in rank 
ordering. These numbers designating the change in debt and 
the change in rank ordering are for explanatory purposes 
only. Assume that the sample data begin in year 19XO. Since 
yearly data were used, all references to period ref er to a 
yearly period. From the yearly data, two series were 
developed, one for the change in business risk and one for 
the change in debt, as explained earlier. These two series 
were correlated, using six different leading and lagging 
relationships. 
Since two measures were used to define the cnange in 






7\ /b\ 7\ /b\/b\/b\ 
% % % % % % % 
Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt 
19XO 19Xl 19X2 19X3 19X4 19X5 19X6 
EBIT EBIT EBIT ;IT EBIT EBIT EBIT 
vv~vvv 
s.o.~rT s.o.EBrT s.o.~rT s.o.IBIT s.o.~rT s.o.~rT 
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Ord\ )d\ )d\ ldVd\7er 
/JR. 0.1 L1R. O. 2 .DR. 0. 3 Lil{. O. 4 .,6.R. O. 5 
Figure 2 An Explanation of the Development of the Correlation Series 
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using the change in long term debt to total assets and once 
using the change in total debt to total assets as the 
measure of change in debt. Both of these measures of change 
in debt were used in testing the two hypotheses, as it is 
unknown which of the two measures of change in debt is the 
correct one. 
The correlation between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk were performed on the series resulting from 
the one hundred fifty-three companies in the sample for each 
of the six leading and lagging relationships. Relationship 
-3is the result of correlating a series beginning with 
change in debt 1 to a series beginning with change in rank 
ordering 3. In other words, the change in debt is leading 
the change in business risk by three periods. Relationship 
-2is the result of correlating the series beginning with 
change in debt 1 with the series beginning with change in 
rank order 2. The change in debt is leading the change in 
business risk by two periods. Relationship -1 is the result 
of correlating the series beginning with change in debt 1 
with change in rank ordering 1. The change in debt is 
leading the change in business risk by one period. 
Relationship +l is the result of correlating the series 
beginning with change in debt 2 with change in rank ordering 
1. The change in debt is lagging the change in business risk 
by one period. Relationship +2 is the result of correlating 
the series beginning with the change in debt 3 with the 
change in rank ordering 1. The change in debt is lagging the 
change in business risk by two periods. Relationship +3 is 
142 
the result of correlating the series beginning with change 
in debt 3 with the series beginning with change in business 
risk 1. The change in debt is lagging the change in business 
risk by three periods. 
It was expected that a firm would show only one 
significant relationship out o.f the six possible 
relationships between changes in debt and changes in 
business risk. However, it was found that many of the firms 
had more than one significant relationship. The total number 
of the correlations and their distribution are shown in 
Table II. 
There was ho estimate made of the probable distribution 
of significant correlations between the six relationships, 
because both the time "f" necessary to make a change in debt 
and the amount of time firms would lead changes in business 
risk if, indeed, signaling were operational, were unknown. 
Because it is not possible to estimate the distribution of 
these significant relationships, no statistical tests are 
possible, other than an analysis of the relative percentage 
of significant correlations in each relationship, and the 
the distribution of significant correlations between leading 
and lagging relationships. 
In Table II the total significant correlations are 
listed by relationship and sign. As can be seen, the leading 
relationships are favored in both cases, with 65% of the 
total significant correlations in the leading relationships 
for the long term debt measure, and 52% with the total debt 
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measure. The distribution of the positive and negative 
correlations is inconclusive, with 46% of the correlations 
being positive with the long term debt measure, and 45% 
positive with the total debt measure. No prior hypothesis 
about this distribution had been made because it was thought 
that market conditions would affect the optimal debt ratio 
for firms. From the initial evidence of high variation in 
debt ratios over time for individual firms, it would appear 
that the optimal debt ratio for firms changed greatly over 
time, and hence, the sign of the correlation could be either 
positive or negative as the optimal debt ratio changed. 
TABLE II 
Total Significant Correlations by Relationship 
-3 -2 -1 +l +2 +3 Total 
Long Term Debt 
Positive 15 8 4 8 9 7 51 
Negative 12 11 22 6 3 6 60 
Total 27 19 26 14 12 13 111 
Total Debt 
Positive 9 12 10 7 6 9 53 
Negative 10 9 11 20 5 9 64 
Total 19 21 21 27 11 18 117 
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Since it was hypothesized that firms used changes in 
debt as a ·signal, the value of the signal was dependent on 
the change in debt occurring prior to the change in business 
risk. Thus, significant correlations in relationships -3, 
-2, or -1 would mean that the change in debt occurred prior 
to the change in business risk. If the significant 
correlation occurred in relationship +l, +2, or +3 then the 
change in debt was contemporaneous or after the change in 
business risk. The distribution and frequency of the initial 
significant correlations is presented in Table III. 
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TABLE III 
First Significant Relationship 
L..Qng Term Debt 
-3 -2 -1 +l +2 +3 
Number of Significant 28 14 20 10 5 8 
Correlations 
Percentage of Total Firms 18% 9% 13% 7% 3% 5% 
in Sample (153) 
Percentage of Significant 32% 17% 24% 12% 6% 10% 
Relationships 
Total Number of Significant Correlations = 85 or 56% of 
total firms. 
Total Debt 
-3 -2 -1 +l +2 +3 
Number of Significant 20 17 10 20 3 11 
Correlations 
Percentage of Total Firms 13% 11% 7% 13% 2% 7% 
in Sample (153) 
Percentage of Significant 25% 21% 12% 25% 4% 14% 
Relationships 
Total Number o.f Significant Correlations = 81 or 53% of 
total firms. 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Either 
-3 -2 -1 +l +2 +3 
Number of Significant 38 19 21 20 2 9 
Correlations 
Percentage of Total Firms 25% 12% 14% 13% 1% 6% 
in Sample (153) 
Percentage of Significant 35% 17% 19% 18% 2% 8% 
Relationships 
Total number of Significant Correlations = 109 or 71% of 
total firms. 
The importance of the initial relationship is that, 
from a standpoint of forecasting an upcoming change in 
business risk, the change in debt is the first signal to 
investors that a change in business risk is upcoming. The 
earlier this signal, the more useful it will be to 
investors. From Table III it is obvious that either method 
lacks strong explanatory power. Only slightly more than half 
of the firms showed significant relationships and even when 
both methods were used, only 71% of the firms showed 
significant relationships. Also, as noted in Table II, the 
distribution, while favoring a leading relationship between 
changes in debt and changes in business risk, is far from 
conclusive. These findings could result from weakness in the 
initial model or from firms being far more erratic in their 
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adjustment of debt levels than heretofore thought. It could 
be that firms are not consistent over time in response to 
changes in business risk in terms of the direction of change 
in debt level and in terms of whether long or short term 
debt is utilized. Further, the model does not include any 
factor for changes in the securities markets, which could 
greatly affect the choice of financing instrument and, 
hence, the strength of the correlation over time between 
changes in business risk and changes in debt. 
A serious problem of the study is concerned with the 
methodology used in the correlation. The correlating of a 
series developed from a change in the percentage of debt 
with the change in rank order presents some possible 
statistical problems. 
A further serious difficulty with the results is 
concerned with the absolute number of significent 
correlations. The number of significant correlations 
identified by the model were approximately the same number 
of significant correlations that would be expected by 
chance, given the number of correlations performed. However, 
the distibution of these correlations does seem to support 
Hypothei. s I I. 
Despite the we_akness of the results, it does appear 
that generally, firms change financial structures prior to 
changes in business risk. When using changes in long term 
debt to total assets as the measure of change in debt, 73% 
of the initial significant correlations were in leading 
relationships. When using changes in total debt to total 
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assets as the measure of change in debt, 58% of the initial 
significant correlations were in leading relationships. When 
using both measures of debt, 71% of the initial significant 
correlations are leading. If the assumption is made that the 
occurances of significant correlations should be evenly 
distributed, the argument favoring a leading relationship is 
stronger. In Table IV the results are presented as 
percentages of the expected amounts in that relationship if 
the assumption is made that the distribution of significant 
relationships were evenly distributed. 
TABLE IV 
Significant Initial Relationships as a Percent of Expected 
Equal Distribution of Relationships 







-2 -1 +l +2 
100% 143% 71% 36% 
126% 74% 148% 22% 





It appears that there is a definite tendency for firms to 
change debt prior to changes in business risk. Further, it 
is clear that cross-sectional studies, even if they identify 
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the near contemporaneous significant changes in debt and 
business risk of relationships -1 and +l, would identify 
little more than a third (37%) of the actual significant 
correlations. In terms of the total sample, such a method 
would identify less than 27% of the total sample as showing 
significant correlations. Even if a model used a leading or 
lagging variable, the distribution of significant 
. 
relationships is too great to be identified unless a 
variable is included for the three leading and three lagging 
relationships of changes in debt and changes in business 
risk. 
The Results of the Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis l. 
The first hypothesis stated that the changes in debt 
level are stongly correlated with changes in business risk. 
This hypothesis was tested, using an alpha of 0.10, with the 
null hypothesis being that there was no correlation between 
changes in debt and changes in business risk. Using as a 
measure of change in debt, change in long term debt to total 
assets, it was found that over half of the firms (56%) in 
the sample showed a strong correlation between changes in 
debt and changes in business risk. Using as a measure ot 
change in debt, change in total debt to total assets, it was 
again found that over half the firms (53%) showed a strong 
correlation between changes in debt and changes in business 
risk. When using both methods of measuring debt, 71% of the 
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firms in the sample showed a strong correlation between 
changes in debt and changes in business risk. 
These results are far from conclusive, as there is a 
serious statistical problem in the overall number of 
correlations identified by the model, as the total number of 
significant correlations are approximately the number that 
would be expected in such a sample size of correlations by 
chance. The distribution of these significant correlations 
among firms does provide weak support for some relationship 
between changes in debt and changes in business risk. It 
does appear that the correlation between change in debt and 
changes in business risk is strong for more than half the 
firms in the sample. Because there is no hypothesized 
distribution of the firms that show a high correlation and 
those that show no correlation, no statistical testing of 
the resulting percentages is possible. 
Hypothesis ll 
The second hypothesis stated that changes in the debt 
level of the firm occur prior to changes in business risk. 
This hypothesis was tested by analyzing the distribution of 
the leading and lagging relationships. It was found that the 
majority of the relationships tended to be leading among the 
firms that had significant correlations. For the long term 
debt correlations, 73% of the correlations were leading, for 
the total debt correlations, 58% were leading, and for the 
significant relationships identified by either methods, 71% 
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of the significant relationships were leading. If the 
concept of leading is expanded to include contemporaneous, 
i.e., relationship +l,then the evidence becomes even 
stronger. The long term debt would show 85%, the total debt 
would show 83%, and either would show 89%. The inclusion of 
the contemporaneous relationship +l as a leading 
relationship is defensible on the grounds that firms may 
not have been able to issue debt prior to changes in 
business risk, but the upcoming change in financial 
structure would probably have been known to the market and, 
therefore, was a response to a change in business risk. 
However, with no hypothesized distribution for the leading 
and lagging relationship, no statistical analysis of these 
results is possible. 
Again the results are far from conclusive, but it 
appears that for firms that show significant correlations 
between changes in debt and changes in business risk, the 
relationship appears to be a leading one, or 
contemporaneous, with the change in debt leading the change 
in business risk. 
conclusions of the Study 
The empirical study is unable to support either of the 
hypotheses strongly. While there is some support for both 
hypotheses, the evidence is far from overwhelming. The study 
was weakened by the aforementioned statistical problems and 
the lack of a definite distribution for the population of 
firms regarding first, the expected number of firms to show 
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significant relationships and second, the timing of these 
significant relationships. Both of these areas need further 
research from both a theoretical and empirical basis. 
Implications of the Study 
The study points out that a fairly complex time series 
model can identify a relationship between debt and business 
risk. This use of non-contemporaneous variables to explain 
financial structure supports the earlier work of Dhrymes and 
Kurz (19), Fama (29), McCabe (59), Myers (68) and Myers and 
Pogue (69). It is obvious that cross-sectional studies or 
even less complex time series models will miss much of the 
relationship between debt level and business risk. 
Further, it appears that the critical factors to 
investigate over time are the change in debt and change in 
business risk, rather than some absolute measure of debt or 
risk as used in MM (62) and all the later studies based on 
their methodology. The multiple significant relationships 
for many firms in the sample and the differing results using 
long term debt versus total debt suppots the slow 
adjustments of debt level reported by Ang (3), Taggart (88) 
and Spies (82). 
The study also provides weak empirical support of 
Heinkel' s model (43) and the signaling concept developed by 
Ross (73) and Leland and Pyle (52). It appears that firms 
act as if they are attempting to provide information to the 
market prior to changes in the business risk ot the firm. 
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The sample used in testing for the factors that affect 
debt changes also appears important. Further, it appears 
that firms are rather erratic in their methods of changing 
debt, with no consistent relationship between changes in 
debt and changes in risk over time, and no consistent 
pattern of using strictly long term or short termdebt. 
There does appear to be an attempt to change debt levels 
prior to changes in business risk, but apparently even the 
better firms are unable to do this consistently. The 
slightly higher distribution of significant correlations in 
the leading relationships does tend to support the idea of 
signaling, but again the results are far from conclusive. 
Further Avenues of Approach 
The model in this study could be expanded to take into 
account several other important influences on the decision 
to change financial structure. These additional variables 
should include some measure of the condition of the markets 
for securities, including possibly the rates on different 
security instruments and other factors which may affect 
selection. There also should be investigation into the 
effect of rates on the timing of issues as suggested by 
Marsh (55) and into the effect of tax shields, such as 
depreciation, on financial structure decisions as suggested 
by Cordes and Sheffrin (16). 
The question of whether firms defined in this study as 
being more able to make optimal financial structure 
decisions are, in fact, different from the rest of the firms 
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on the market (i.e., a two-tiered market as suggested in the 
theoretical model) should be investigated. Finally, a more 
detailed examination of the actual changes in debt for the 
firms in the study needs to be undertaken. Since there 
appears to be no definite direction of change in debt level 
as a response to change in business risk, the conditions 
facing the firm before, during and after a change in 
business risk should be investigated. It is possible that 
tha correlation model used in this study hid many of the 
significant relationships because firms were neither 
consistent in the direction of change in debt in response to 
a change in business risk nor consistent in using long or 
short term debt to adjust financial structure. 
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Appendix A 
List of Companies Included in Study 
Company number, industry description, and industry 
number are from the Compustat system of organization of all 





ACF Industries 800 Rail road Equip 3 7 40 
Abbott Labs 2824 Drugs 2830 
Alcan Aluminium 13716 Prim.Smelt-Ref in 3330 
Nonfer Metals 
Allied Chemicals 19087 Chemicals 2800 
Allied Stores 19519 Retail-Dept.Stores 5311 
Alum. Co. of 22249 Prim Smelt-Refin 3330 
America Nonf er Metals 
Amac Inc. 23127 Metal Mining 1000 
American Brands 24703 Cigarettes 2111 
American Broad- 24735 Radio-TV 4830 
casting Broadcasting 
American Can Corp. 24843 Glass Containers 3221 
American Cyanimid 25321 Chemicals & 2800 
Allied Products 
American Standard 29717 Heating Eqpt & 3430 
Plumbing Fixtures 




American Tel & Tel 30177 
AMP Inc 31897 




Atlantic Richfield 48825 
Co. 
Avon Products 54303 
Beckman Indus. 75815 
Bendix Corp. 









Braun Group, Inc. 115657 
Burlington Ind. 121691 
CBS, Inc. 124845 
CPC Intl 126149 
Capital Cities 129861 
Communications 







Components & Acces 
Cane Sugar 2062 
Refining 
Retail-Dept. Stores 5311 
Petroleum Refining 2911 
Perfumes Cosmetics 2844 
Toiletries Prod. 
Engineering Lab & 3811 
Research Equip. 









Motor Vehicle Parts 3714 
Footwear Except 3140 
Rubber 
Textile Mill Prod. 2200 
Radio TV 4830 
Broadcasting 
Wet Corn Milling 2046 
Newspapers-Print 2711 
& Publishing 
Retail-Dept. Stores 5311 
Construction 
Mach & Equip 
3531 
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J:&ID~ Company Industry Industry 
.N.Ymber Number 
Celanese Corp. 150843 Chemicals & Allied 2800 
Prods 
Cities Service 173036 Petroleum Refining 2911 
Colgate-Palmolive 194162 Soap & Other 2841 
Co. Detergents 
Combustion Engi- 200273 Engines & Turbines 3510 
neering 
Cone Mills Corp. 206813 
Conoco, Inc. 208251 
Continental Group 211452 
Copper Inds., Inc. 216669 
Corning Glass Works219217 
Crown Cork & Seal 228255 
Crown Zellerbach 228669 
J. Deere & Co. 244199 
Diamond Intl. 252669 
Dow Chemical 260543 
Dresser Indus. 261597 










Textile Mill Prod. 2200 
Petroleum Refining 2911 
Glass Containers 3221 
General Indus. 3560 
Mach. & Eqpt. 
Flat Glass 3210 
Glass Contaipers 3221 
Paper & Allied 2600 
Prod. 
Farm & Garden 3520 
Mach. & Eq pt. 
Paperboard 2650 
Containers 
Chemical & Allied 2800 
Prods. 
Oilfield Mach. ·3533 
& Eqpt. 
Bituminous Coal 
& Lignite MN 
1211 
Meat Products 2010 
Petroleum Refining 2911 
Perfumes Cosmetics 2844 
Toil tries Prod. 













General Foods 369856 
General Motors 370442 
General Portland 370514 
Getty Oil Co. 374280 
B F Goodrich 382388 
Goodyear Tire 382550 
& Rubber 
Gulf Oil Co. 402460 
Halliburton co. 406216 
Harcourt Brace 411631 
Jovanovich 
Hart Schaffner 416162 
& Marx 
Holiday Inn, Inc. 435081 
Honeywell, Inc. 43 8506 
Ideal Basic Indus. 451542 
Inland Steel 457470 
Inter co, Inc. 458506 
Industry 
Paving & Roofing 
Materials 
Motor Vehicles 
& Car Bodies 
Rolling & Drawing 






Elec. & Elec. Mach. 3600 
Eqpt. & Supply 
Food & Related 2000 
Products 
Motor Vehicles 3711 
& Car Bodies 
Cement Hydraulic 3241 
Crude Petroleum 1311 
& Natural Gas 
Rubber & Plastic 3000 
Products 
Rubber & Plastic 3000 
Products 
Petroleum Refining 2911 




Apparel & Other 2300 
Finished Prods. 
Hotels-Motels 7011 
















Intl. Minerals & 
Intl. Telephone 
& Tele. 
Joy Mfg. Co. 
Com.I2fill.Y Industry 
Number 
,458702 Blast Furnaces 
& Steel Works 
459200 Off ice Computing 














Special Indus. Mach.3550 
Kaiser Alum & Chem 483008 Prim Smelt-Refin. 







Lone Star Inds. 
Macy (R H) & Co. 
Mar shall Fields, 
Inc. 









Mayer(Oscar) & Co. 577896 
MC Dermott & Co. 580022 
MC Graw-Edison Co. 580628 
Meredith Corp. 589433 
Paper & Allied 2600 
Prods. 
Construction 3531 
Mach. & Eqpt. 
Dairy Prods. 2020 
Retail-Grocery 5411 









Elec. Transmission 3610 
& Di st r. Eq pt. 
Periodicals-





Metromedia, Inc. 591690 
Minnesota Mining 604059 
& Mfg. Co. 





























Phillips Petroleum 718507 
Pitney-Bowes,Inc. 724479 






Eqpt. & Suppl. 
Petroleum Refining 2911 
Household Furniture 2510 




Distilled Rectif. 2085 
Blend Beveg. 
Paving & Roofing 
Materials 
Blast Furnces & 
Steel Works 
Bituminous Coal 




Engines & Turbines 3510 










Petroleum Refining 2911 
Off ice Computing 








Potlatch Corp. 737628 
Proctor & Gamble 742718 
Quaker Oats 747402 
RCA Corp. 749285 
Raytheon Co. 755111 
Reliance Electric 759457 
Republic Steel 760779 
Corp. 
Rexnord, Inc. 













St. Regis Paper Co.793453 
Scott Paper Co. 809877 
Seagram Co., Ltd. 811850 
Sears Roebuck & Co.812387 





Paper & Allied 
Prod. 
Soap & Other 
Detergents 



















Construction Mach. 3531 
& Eqpt. 
Cigarettes 
Pr irn Smelt-Ref in. 
Nonf er Metals 
Petroleum Ref ning 
Retail-Grocery 
Stores 
Bit urninous Coal 






Paper & Allied Prod.2600 




Retail-Dept. Stores 5311 
Petroleum Refining 2911 
Food & Kindred Prod. 2000 
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.,C.Qmpany .,CQmpany Industry Industry 
Number Number 
Standard Oil Co. 853683 Petroleum Refining 2911 
(CAL) 
Standard Oil Co. 853700 Petroleum Refining 2911 
Stauffer Chem Co. 857721 INDL Inorganic Chem 2810 
Sterling Drug Inc. 859264 
Sun Co. 866762 
Superior Oil Co. 868273 
TRW Inc. 872649 
Taft Broadcasting 873635 
Tenneco Inc 880370 
Texaco Inc 881694 
Texas Instruments 882508 
Textron Inc 883203 
Time Inc 887224 
Times Mirror 887360 
UMC Industries 902878 
Unilever NV 904784 
Union Carbide 905581 
Union Oil Of Calif 907770 
us Steel Corp 912656 




& Natural Gas 
Motor Vehicles 












Ref rig & Service 
Ind Machine 
Soap & Other 
Detergents 
Chem & Allied Prod 
Petroleum Refining 
Blast Furnaces & 
Steel Works 






















Com12any J:.Qm12any Industry Indust,y 
Number Number 
Warner & Swasey 934408 Metal Working 3540 
Mach & Eqpt 
Westinghouse Elec 960402 Elec & Electr Mach 3600 
Eqpt & Supp 
Whirlpool Corp 963320 Household 3630 
Appliances 
Winn Dixie Stores 97 4280 Retail-Grocery 5411 
Stores 
Woolworth (FW) 980881 Retail-Variety 5331 
Stores 
Appendix B 
Raw Results of Correlations 
The following data are the raw empirical resul-cs. 
The numbers represent the correlation coefficients between 
changes in debt and changes in risk. For each company, two 
sets of correlations were done, with the first six 
correlations representing the correlations of the cnange in 
long term debt with the change in risk and the second line 
of six correlations representing the correlations ot the 
change in total debt with the change in risk. 
The six columns, numbered one through six, 
represent the different lagged and lead relationships 
between changes in debt and changes in risk. Column one is 
change in debt leading change in risk by three periods. 
Column two is the change in debt leading the cnange in risk 
by two periods. Column three is the change in debt leading 
the change in risk by one period. Column four is the change 
in debt lagging the change in risk by one period. Column 
Five is the change in debt lagging the change in risk by two 
periods. Column six is the change in debt lagging the change 
in risk by three periods. 
The last column, Results, is a summation of when 
significant correlations occurred. A significant correlation 
was when the correlation betwen change in debt and change in 
risk was greater than .39 or less than -.39. An asterisk 
(*) denotes a significant relationship. 
The company is listed using the .,C,Qmpstat numbering 
system and cross-reference is available in Appendix A • 
company l. 2. .l .i .5. Q_ Results 
800 -.191 -.098 -.024 -.187 .161 -.275 
-.009 .043 .137 -.459* .150 -.097 4 
2824 -.150 .404* -.502* .060 .169 -.195 2,3 
.101 -.086 -.122 -.067 .036 .154 
13716 .069 -.502* .154 .158 -.107 -.101 2 
-.420* • 085 .438* .104 -.018 -.035 1,3 
172 
173 
Com:gan:t: .l. 2. .l .i ~ .2_ ReQuJ.ts 
19087 -.118 -.011 • 217 -.407* .464* .132 4,5 
-.273 .123 .162 -.217 .136 .400* 6 
19519 .430* -.295 .305 -.359 .145 -.210 1 
.375 -.426* -.394* -.240 .030 .194 2,3 
22249 -.377 .205 .230 -.249 -.313 .195 
.001 .193 - .087 - .343 -.145 .277 
23127 .133 -.173 -.059 "'."'.176 .244 .129 
-.027 .233 -.105 -.482* .440* -.090 4,5 
24703 .184 -.068 -.084 .066 -.127 -.142 
-.071 .110 .034 -.147 - • 065 -.124 
24735 .157 -.084 -.510* .257 -.213 .258 3 
-.101 .125 -.672* .216 -.082 .178 3 
24843 -.005 .035 -.129 .348 -.110 - .3 41 
.316 -.085 .176 -.135 .098 -.246 
25321 .054 -.174 -.163 .107 .037 .449* 6 
-.052 -.001 .116 - .138 -.052 .442* 6 
29717 .404* .103 -.098 -.316 .170 -.050 1 
.364 .193 -.108 -.226 .095 -.112 
30095 -.633* .044 .032 -.006 -.192 .184 1 
.193 • 865* -.147 -.412* -.122 .307 2,4 
30177 .056 .115 -.136 -.267 .147 .312 
-.161 .041 -.057 - .086 .269 .063 
31897 .266 -.478* -.376 .329 .091 .040 2 
-.713* .112 .576* -.237 -.303 .098 1,3 
32172 .354 -.322 -.160 • 344 .181 - • 3 98* 6 
.513* -.495* .077 -.114 .187 .135 1,2 
45573 -.110 .377 -.665* -.008 .312 .194 3 
-.075 -.114 -.049 -.059 .015 -.200 
48825 -.452* .359 -.313 .328 -.309 -.108 1 
- • 56 9* .344 -.163 .098 -.225 -.196 1 
54303 .023 .140 -.279 -.144 .166 -.270 
.291 -.066 - .093 .043 -.018 -.192 
75815 .175 -.260 -.195 .397* -.225 -.067 4 
-.111 .051 -.192 -. 234 -.108 .197 
81689 -.527* .320 .049 .165 .034 -.220 1 
.079 .250 .217 -.213 -.206 -.336 
174 
Com:gani .l 2. .l .i .5. ~ Results 
91797 -.328 .059 .002 .114 -.075 -.053 
-.249 .391* .012 -.215 -.047 .233 2 
97023 .278 .293 -.432* .279 .182 -.563* 3,6 
.094 .028 -.274 .129 .105 -.443* 6 
99599 -.479* -.282 .595* .046 -.158 .105 1,3 
-.430* -.187 .433* -.321 .220 .153 1,3 
99725 .413 * -.425* -.005 .380 -.053 -.279 1,2 
-.300 -.125 .519* -.092 -.177 .220 3 
115657 -.215 .163 .027 .025 -.064 .295 
-.256 .364 .077 -.264 .3 81 -.084 
121691 -.650* .177 -.07 5 .144 -.198 .237 1 
-.378 .143 .286 -.586* .234 .189 ·4 
124845 -.006 -.316 .285 -.129 - .189 .531* 6 
.179 -.143 .091 -.295 .391* .253 5 
126149 -.216 .071 -.181 .151 .190 -.339 
-.064 .205 -.296 .212 - .193 -.315 
139861 .018 .329 -.190 .049 .357 -.325 
.017 .429* -.112 -.109 .397* -.184 2,4 
146227 -.082 .294 .049 -.175 -.163 .26 5 
.040 .043 -.267 .134 -.331 .063 
149123 -.225 -.139 -.101 -.197 .421* .012 5 
.101 .242 -.561* -.061 .370 -.134 3 
150843 .163 .119 -.059 .166 -.038 .102 
-.038 .183 .105 .003 -.139 .189 
173036 -.236 .099 -.270 .503* -.17 8 -.269 4 
-.256 .356 - .o 87 -.062 .117 -.270 
194162 -.070 • 086 -.011 .167 .144 -.26 8 
-.361 .098 . - • 078 .130 .261 -.179 
200273 .078 - . 0 86 .136 .225 -.067 -.540* 6 
- .186 -.448* - .080 .140 .016 -.218 2 
206813 .391 -.555* -.121 .213 -.117 .071 2 
-.094 -.258 -.255 .013 .254 .399* 6 
208251 -.073 -.181 -.008 .257 .046 .030 
.466* -.057 -.455* -.250 .312 .118 1,3 
211452 .005 .140 -.353 • 265 .278 -.091 
-.174 -.087 .263 - .293 .298 .180 
175 
com:gan~ l. 2. ~ A_ .5. Q Re§ults 
216669 -.106 .144 -.492* .214 -.103 .444* 3,6 
.167 -.352 - .083 .100 -.067 .333 
219327 -.259 -.239 .340 -.065 -.074 .045 
-.444* -.146 .314 -.298 .046 .084 1 
228255 -.068 -.039 -.295 .242 .069 .101 
-.394* .127 .225 -.213 -.242 .626* 1,6 
228669 -.182 • 081 -.388* .264 .116 -.115 3 
-.224 .035 - .086 • 239 -.269 -.046 
244199 .145 -.059 .027 -.271 • 0 88 .246 
.218 -.346 .327 .292 .016 .223 
252669 .495* .008 -.057 - • 3 89* .275 .147 1,4 
.476* - • 087 - • 034 -.431* .224 .011 1,4 
260543 .163 -.163 -.190 .262 .157 .250 
- • 062 -.155 -.243 -.040 .332 .181 
261597 .176 -.102 .045 .252 -.154 .020 
.306 -.011 -.072 -.400* .461* .001 4,5 
276461 -.235 -.224 -.239 .349 .166 -.044 
.006 - .357 -.153 .160 .138 .247 
296470 -.350 .137 -.096 .267 -.060 -.330 
-.128 .278 • 038 -.255 .063 - • 03 5 
302290 -.332 -.514* .126 .099 -.211 .022 2 
-.371 .344 .332 -.337 -.187 -.146 
302808 -.335 .630* -.242 -.132 -.004 .112 2 
-.129 .464* -.226 -.057 .033 -.074 2 
314099 - .180 .012 .121 .303 -.552* .461* 5·,6 
-.087 - .3 82 .491* .077 -.272 .213 3 
339711 .145 -.112 .069 .184 .144 .028 
-.195 .163 .001 .182 -.124 .136 
345370 .048 - • 081 -.215 -.203 .356 .329 
-.260 .195 .184 -.523* .556* .101 4,5 
361765 .484* .052 -.301 -.141 .267 .030 1 
.424* .330 -.507* .036 .091 -.409* 1,3,6 
369604 .101 -.190 .450* -.070 -. 083 - • 011 3 
.163 -.201 .372 -.329 .133 .206 
369856 .002 -.074 .079 .013 .009 .137· 
-.064 -.053 .126 .063 -.200 -.057 
176 
com:gani l. 2 J. .i .5_ .2. Resul.tli2 
370442 .199 .163 -.286 -.100 .020 .205 
- .012 .094 .259 -.681* .370 .147 4 
370514 .186 .394 .248 -.541* .301 -.242 4 
.132 .339 .152 -.473* .395* -.114 4,5 
374280 -.086 .209 .020 -.448* .139 -.117 4 
-.189 .282 .116 -.634* .024 .141 4 
382388 - .142 -.136 -.152 .377 -.109 -.089 
-.221 -.243 .o 86 .121 .097 .003 
382550 .066 .176 -.230 .257 -.386 .156 
-.092 -.036 .013 .101 .184 -.428* 6 
402460 -.147 -. 346 -.153 .166 -.140 -.114 
-.119 .102 .151 -.405* -.203 .169 4 
406216 -.132 .151 -.034 .127 -.172 .156 
-.209 .046 .149 -.047 -.027 -.063 
411631 .167 .211 -.456* • 3 86 -.320 -.037 3 
.003 .263 -.549* .278 -.035 -.207 3 
416162 .537* .011 - .165 .185 -.062 -.039 1 
.223 -.059 .341 -.180 -.278 -.128 
435081 -.045 .132 .118 .006 .056 -.078 
.042 .035 .058 .030 -.162 .121 
438506 -.466* .264 -.306 .26 9 -.101 - .140 1 
- • 601 * .178 .169 -.198 .206 -.257 1 
451542 • 072 .159 -.288 • 314 -.144 .14 8 
• 062 • 231 -.262 .125 -.084 .225 
457470 -.306 .358 -.563* • 3 87 -.175 .056 3 
.207 .040 -.392* .140 -.301 .3 87 3 
458506 .520* -.387 .195 .049 .097 -.131 1 
.458* -.487* .222 -.118 .108 .009 1,2 
458702 -.379 .461* -.156 -.190 .322 .006 2 
-.021 .288 .046 -.567* .505* .259 4,5 
459200 .37 4 .119 -.551* .188 • 032 -.034 3 
.102 .195 - .016 -.255 -.184 .393 
459578 -.142 .157 .071 .004 .013 -.157 
-.254 .420* - .096 -.084 .006 -.198 2 
459884 .359 .206 -.246 .023 • 083 • 03 2 
.173 .350 - .o 86 -.273 .114 .192 
177 
com:gan2 .l 2. .3.. A_ 5. .6. R~~ults 
460470 -.004 -.036 -.193 -.052 .325 -.495* 6 
.032 .300 - .171 .131 -.110 .118 
481196 .128 -.024 -.118 -.101 .128 .227 
.370 .129 -.149 -.348 - .014 .391 * 6 
483008 -.006 .181 -.225 -.249 .442* -.273 5 
-.034 .235 - .316 -.106 .165 -.292 
494368 • 215 .113 -.227 .068 -.057 -.440* 6 
• 085 .214 - • .294 .133 .009 -.411 
500170 .287 -.244 -.400* -.001 .476* -.219 3,5 
-.090 -.084 .265 .043 -.108 -.064 
500755 .066 .447* -.172 -.306 .518* -.365 2,5 
.008 .441* -.669* .239 .416* -.258 2,3,5 
501044 -.650* .433* -.101 .026 .187 -.242 1,2 
.014 .407* -.095 -.419* .361 -.447* 2,4,6 
542290 -.178 .258 -.016 -.235 .204 .134 
-.129 .153 .201 -.272 -.130 .286 
55613 9 -.055 .053 -.541* .245 -.304 .366 3 
.220 .011 -.329 .089 -.194 .013 
572342 .379 .079 -.561* .235 - .413 * .257 3,5 
.322 .139 -.554* .242 -.458* .345 3,5 
577778 .315 .486 * -.354 • 082 .165 -.332 2 
.418* -.182 .315 -.198 .3 87 -.325 1 
577896 .133 .094 • 014 .169 -.112 -.052 
.235 .310 .083 -.478* .269 .183 4 
-
580033 -.047 .324 -.443* .060 .372 -.293 3 
-.289 .513* -.378 - .238 .563* -.550 2,5 
580628 -.027 .3 89* - .23 8 -.078 -.037 .163 2 
.049 .024 -.278 .048 .190 -.245 
589433 - .287 .143 -.136 .100 -.198 .624* 6 
-.220 .003 -.157 .189 .029 .121 
591690 .163 -.221 .201 .088 .114 -.004 
.170 - .281 ·• 217 - • 065 .233 -.006 
604059 .162 -.469* -.438* .191 .669* -.035 2,3,5 
- .382 -.420* .218 .652* .208 -.234 2,4 
607059 -.256 -.102 .3 97* -.279 .108 .063 3 
-.271 .o 82 .499* -.570* .268 .066 3,4 
178 
compani l 2. ~ .i .5. _[ Rei;iulti;i 
608030 -.477* .157 .132 • 284 -.524* .272 1,5 
- .343 .034 .035 .406 -.596* .319 5 
611662 .293 -.001 -.259 .210 .331 -.340 
-.122 -.137 -.104 .186 .358 -.397* 6 
620076 -.232 • 081 .127 .098 -.277 .031 
-.257 .185 • 062 .005 -.043 -.087 
6356 55 -.410 • 081 .192 -.033 .135 -.071 
-.414* .213 .125 -.194 .327 -.239 1 
636316 -.293 .111 -.048 -.322 -.154 .209 
-.151 .158 .036 -.410* -.233 .052 4 
637844 -.406* -.234 -.237 .362 .110 -.058 1 
.099 -.480* .247 .023 .152 -.432* 2,6 
6567 80 -.045 .161 -.277 -.243 -.030 -.063 
-.049 .193 -.272 -.156 -.191 • 019 
690020 -.234 .247 -.26 9 • 038 .183 .375 
-.297 .092 -.102 .128 .151 .o 83 
690734 .013 -.065 .133 -.263 .186 .017 
.094 -.029 .201 -.388* .204 -.006 4 
690768 .292 -.474* -. 0 80 .334 .141 - • 093 2 
• 079 -.370 .027 .215 .150 -.369 
693506 .215 .130 - • 4 89* .250 -.146 .203 3 
.227 -.085 -.292 .217 -.296 .420* 6 
717081 .065 .072 .006 - • 089 .185 .066 
-.032 .005· .078 -.076 .217 -.369 
718167 -.209 .202 -.427* -.324 .320 -.355 3 
- .023 -.310 -.268 -.105 .364 .147 
718507 -.148 • 07 4 -.104 - .107 -.261 -.018 
-.069 .465* -.259 - .381 .117 .o 86 2 
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